News round-up, June 23, 2023
”The Fish Dies By The Mouth…
During the previous week, the President of the United States, Joe Biden, delivered a sequence of impromptu statements that have significantly escalated the tension between the United States and China, as well as Russia, to a level that is approaching a critical point.
“It was about 3 o'clock in the morning when I was abruptly awoken by a loud crashing sound emanating bedroom. The noise resembled that of a collapsing and the subsequent falling of all items stored in the garret onto the floor. I on my bed, I hastily vacated discerned that the sole object that had descended was the stack of containers that my spouse had previously arranged in the corner to organize closet. There was no evidence of any objects having fallen from an attic, as no such space existed within structure. Remained undamaged, and I emerged unscathed.
David Goleman
The current geopolitical situation is a far cry from David Goleman's reflection. The tension between the United States, China, and Russia has reached a point where it is almost boiling over.
The role of language in shaping a state and accomplishing political goals is of utmost importance. Political linguistics can be a potent instrument for persuasion in the realm of politics, particularly in the context of speeches and campaigns. In a world that is politically fragmented, it is imperative that language is inclusive and demonstrates respect for diverse perspectives. It is imperative to refrain from using language that is divisive and inflammatory as it has the potential to exacerbate polarization and conflict. It is imperative to pursue shared interests and endeavor to comprehend divergent perspectives by means of transparent and productive discourse.
On September 22, 2021, an article authored by Ted Anthony for the Associated Press reported that China's President Xi Jinping, following in the footsteps of U.S. President Joe Biden, utilized a composed pre-recorded video message during the 76th session of the United Nations General Assembly.
“China's President Xi Jinping remark, in which he underscored his country's unwavering dedication to multilateralism. President Jinping also urged nations to engage in dialogue and cooperation to resolve disputes. The statement pertains to the escalating tensions between China and the United States. President Xi emphasized the importance of ensuring that the success of one country does not impede the progress of another, and that the global community has ample space for collaborative development and advancement of all nations.
On March 27, 2022, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) published an article written by Anthony Zurcher, titled "Reflections on Why Biden's Off-Script Remarks About Putin Are So Dangerous. The article delves into the potential consequences of President Biden's unscripted comments regarding Russian President Vladimir Putin over the past week, the President of the United States, Joe Biden, delivered a series of impromptu statements that have significantly escalated the tension between the United States and Russia, bringing it to a point of almost reaching its boiling point.
As contrast tone in a recent statement from the White House, Mr Henry Kissinger, the former Secretary of State, “cautioned that in situations where two powers of comparable strength are in opposition, it frequently leads to military confrontation. The necessity for well-defined principles in managing conflicts bears resemblance to the period preceding the onset of World War I. The outstanding question pertains to the viability of harmonious cohabitation between China and the United States and whether it can be attained without the potential risk of military conflict. Kissinger proposes the implementation of measures aimed at promoting competition in strategic domains, alongside the creation of a continuous high-level dialogue between Beijing and Washington.
In this blog post that President Jose Biden, —considering his age— aspires to be commemorated from a historical perspective. Nothing strange in the longing if it is based on convectional parameters. Older people tend to be more reckless... Why, the answer is very easy, and they have nothing to lose... “The proposal put forth by Mr Kissinger to improve communication between Beijing and Washington has not received widespread support. The current crisis has been intensified by recent events, including the deployment of armaments by NATO against Russia and China's assertion that Russia's intervention in Ukraine was a result of a flawed security framework in Europe. This has contributed to an escalation of tensions and a deterioration of diplomatic relations between the involved parties. The use of the —law of club— as a mechanism for preserving order in contemporary society is a subject of apprehension and is commonly viewed as antiquated.
“China has responded to recent comments made by US President Joe Biden, in which he referred to Chinese President Xi Jinping as a "dictator," by accusing the US of engaging in political provocation.
The possibility of a third nuclear age in Ukraine is concerning. According to Olivier Zajec's article in Le Monde Diplomatic, the situation is still being determined. It's important to remember that the first atomic age was based on deterrence, while the second was focused on eliminating nuclear weapons. However, we may face a much more dangerous and uncertain situation with the current state of affairs. Leaders must consider the consequences and take responsibility to prevent catastrophic outcomes.
Most Read…
La menace d’une guerre nucléaire en Europe…
By using its nuclear weapons, Russia could save humanity from a global catastrophe,’ the influential political scientist Sergey Karaganov wrote in a 13 June article published by his think tank, the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy. In this terrifying piece, Karaganov, who is close to Putin, explained that to avoid a stalemate in the war and ‘break the West’s will to support the Kiev junta’, Moscow should resort to targeted nuclear strikes on European cities. ‘The most striking characteristic of the war in Ukraine is its nuclear backdrop,’ observed Olivier Zajec in April 2022. ‘Events are unfolding as if the world was hurriedly relearning the vocabulary and fundamentals of nuclear strategy, forgotten since the cold war.’
By Olivier Zajec, June Editions, 2023, Le Monde DiplomatiqueSpecial focus on natural resources
Energy: conflicts, illusions, solutions
“Reflections from Le Monde Diplomatique …
Siemens Energy's wind turbine troubles to last years, shares tumble
On Friday, Siemens Energy's share price took a sharp dip, marking the most significant drop since the company's spin-off from Siemens and separate listing in 2020. The sudden decline has caught the attention of many investors and analysts, who are closely monitoring the situation to see how it will impact the energy industry as a whole.
REUTERS By Sabine Wollrab, Maria Sheahan and Christoph Steitz, June 23, 2023Governments at Paris summit to finalise climate finance roadmap
Almost 40 leaders to present plans for overhaul of public financial institutions including World Bank
The Guardian by Fiona Harvey in Paris, 23 Jun 2023 
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https://www.cnbc.com/video/2022/03/02/while-theres-significant-disruption-in-europe-renewable-energy-may-accelerate-in-the-us-aes-ceo.html
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La menace d’une guerre nucléaire en Europe…
By using its nuclear weapons, Russia could save humanity from a global catastrophe,’ the influential political scientist Sergey Karaganov wrote in a 13 June article published by his think tank, the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy. In this terrifying piece, Karaganov, who is close to Putin, explained that to avoid a stalemate in the war and ‘break the West’s will to support the Kiev junta’, Moscow should resort to targeted nuclear strikes on European cities. ‘The most striking characteristic of the war in Ukraine is its nuclear backdrop,’ observed Olivier Zajec in April 2022. ‘Events are unfolding as if the world was hurriedly relearning the vocabulary and fundamentals of nuclear strategy, forgotten since the cold war.’
By Olivier Zajec, June Editions, 2023, Le Monde Diplomatique‘If we refuse to use them, why do we have them?’
The first nuclear age was marked by deterrence, the second by hopes that nuclear weapons might be eliminated. The war in Ukraine may herald a third nuclear age, much more dangerous and uncertain than what came before.
On 11 March, President Joe Biden sharply rejected politicians’ and experts’ calls for the United States to get more directly involved in the Ukraine war, ruling out direct conflict with Russia: ‘The idea that we’re going to send in offensive equipment and have planes and tanks and trains going in with American pilots and American crews — just understand ... that’s called World War III’ (1). He nonetheless accepted war was possible if the Russian offensive spread to the territory of a NATO member state.
Thus a distinction was established between NATO’s territory (inviolable) and the territory of Ukraine, which falls into a unique geostrategic category: according to the US, maintaining this distinction will require an accurate understanding of the balance of power between the belligerents on the ground, strict control of the degree of operational involvement of Ukraine’s declared supporters (especially concerning the nature of arms transfers to Ukraine) and, above all, continual reassessment of the limits of Russia’s determination — all with a view to leaving room for a negotiated way out acceptable to both Russia and Ukraine. Some trace the US’s caution back to a statement by Russia’s president Vladimir Putin on 24 February: ‘No matter who tries to stand in our way or ... create threats for our country and our people, they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.’ These words, and his order that Russia’s nuclear forces be placed on high alert (‘a special regime of combat duty’), amounted to attempted coercion, and could suggest that Biden’s reaction constituted backing down. In January, neoconservative New York Times columnist Bret Stephens had called for the revival of the concept of the ‘free world’, and warned, ‘The bully’s success ultimately depends on his victim’s psychological surrender’ (2).
One might argue that it is not for the bully to say how much aggression is ‘acceptable’ from countries that, with help from allies, seek to defend their own borders and their right to exist. Stephens’s warning could equally apply to past international crises, such as Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. But the territory being invaded today is Ukraine, which is far bigger. And the aggressor — Russia — has strategic arguments entirely different from those of Saddam Hussein.
‘Scenarios for use of nuclear arms’
To help understand the issues at stake in US-Russian relations today, and Joe Biden’s irritation with the extreme positions of some of his fellow Americans and some allies, it’s worth recalling Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov’s 2018 statement that Russia’s nuclear doctrine ‘has unambiguously limited the threshold of use of nuclear weapons to two ... hypothetical, entirely defensive scenarios. They are as follows: [first,] in response to an act of aggression against Russia and/or against our allies if nuclear or other types of mass destruction weapons are used and [second,] with use of conventional arms but only in case our state’s very existence would be in danger’ (3).
Nuclear doctrines are made to be interpreted, and Russia experts have long debated exactly how (4). In Foreign Affairs, Olga Oliker, director of International Crisis Group’s Europe and Central Asia programme, writes that ‘although it has not been used before, Putin’s phrase “a special regime of combat duty” does not appear to signal a serious change in Russia’s nuclear posture’ (5).
But, at least in terms of how the present crisis is perceived, we cannot ignore the implications of the second scenario in Lavrov’s 2018 statement — an existential threat to Russia. Do Russia’s leaders really see Ukraine’s strategic status, and therefore its potential NATO accession, as critical? If they do, that would explain why, contrary to all normal logic and political good sense, they have given NATO a reason to make a stand and irretrievably damaged Russia’s international standing by deciding it is rational to attack Ukraine unilaterally — and then opting for a blunt ‘nuclearisation’ of their crisis diplomacy, so as to keep other potential belligerents out of the conflict.
Is this just a cynical manoeuvre, banking on Western weakness and hesitation, to give Russia the greatest possible freedom to act? Former British prime minister Tony Blair asks on his thinktank’s website: ‘Is it sensible to tell [Putin] in advance that whatever he does militarily, we will rule out any form of military response? Maybe that is our position and maybe that is the right position, but continually signalling it, and removing doubt in his mind, is a strange tactic’ (6).
Who would take responsibility?
Yet although diplomatic manoeuvring is clearly going on, who — with responsibility for what comes next — would be able to say today precisely to what extent this Russian cynicism, which seeks to achieve its objectives through aggressive drawing of red lines, also stems from strategic conviction fuelled by frustrations that have come to a head? We should not underestimate the dangers of this mixture if the West were to test Russia’s siege mentality head on in Ukraine.
Others asked these questions, well before Biden. In the first days of the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis, when the US joint chiefs of staff were taking a hard line, President John F Kennedy expressed the key issues not in military terms, but in terms of perception. He told a meeting of ExComm (the Executive Committee of the National Security Council), ‘Let me just say a little, first, about what the problem is, from my point of view ... we ought to think of why the Russians did this.’
The declassified archives on this key moment in history reveal that Kennedy talked of a blockade, of the importance of giving Khrushchev a way out, and of avoiding escalation to nuclear weapons, all while preserving the US’s international credibility. General Curtis E LeMay, US Air Force chief of staff, replied, ‘This blockade and political action, I see leading into war ... This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich.’ The joint chiefs were unanimous in recommending immediate military action. Kennedy thanked them, dryly, and, in the days that followed, did the exact opposite.
‘And [the joint chiefs] were wrong,’ historian Martin J Sherwin concludes in a recent book on decision-making processes in nuclear crises. ‘Had the president not insisted on a blockade, had he accepted the chiefs’ recommendations (also favoured by the majority of his ExComm advisers), he unwittingly would have precipitated a nuclear war’ (7).
The central issue is indeed the significance of the nuclear signalling in which Russia has wrapped its premeditated conventional attack. Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky doubts Putin will really use nuclear weapons: ‘I think that the threat of nuclear war is a bluff. It’s one thing to be a murderer. It’s another to commit suicide. Every use of nuclear weapons means the end for all sides, not just for the person using them’ (8).
At the risk of appearing spineless, Biden seems to have reserved judgment. For the moment he is restraining his most aggressive allies, such as Poland, and focusing on the coercive force of the economic sanctions, rather than any initiative that might give Putin an excuse for escalation — starting with the use of tactical nuclear weapons, of which Russia is thought to have around 2,000.
‘Putin is bluffing on nuclear’
Is Biden wrong? On 14 March General Rick J Hillier, former chief of Canada’s defence staff, told CBS that NATO should impose a no-fly zone over Ukraine because Putin was bluffing. John Feehery, former communications director to House Majority Whip Tom DeLay, thought so too: ‘Biden’s weakness on Ukraine invited [the] Russian invasion ... When Putin hinted that he was willing to use nuclear weapons to achieve his goals, Biden said that we weren’t going to use ours, which seems to me to defeat the purpose of having those weapons in the first place. If we refuse to use them, why do we have them?’ (9). Stanford historian Niall Ferguson agrees: ‘Putin is bluffing on nuclear, we shouldn’t have backed down.’ And is dismayed that ‘media coverage has become so sentimental and ignorant of military realities’ (10).
But what are these military ‘realities’? What is the nature of the problem? It’s the possibility that Russia will resort to first use of nuclear weapons in an armed conflict that is already under way. Nina Tannenwald, whose book The Nuclear Taboo (Cambridge, 2007) has become a key text in international relations, believes the risk is too great, and supports the US’s wait-and-see strategy: ‘Despite scattered calls in the US for the creation of a “no-fly zone” over some or all of Ukraine, the Biden administration has widely resisted. In practice, this could mean shooting down Russian planes. It could lead to World War III’ (11).
The most striking characteristic of the war in Ukraine is its nuclear backdrop. Events are unfolding as if the world was hurriedly relearning the vocabulary and fundamentals of nuclear strategy, forgotten since the cold war. This is certainly true of Western media and governments, as they become conscious of the potentially destructive sequences of events that link the operational-tactical and politico-strategic dimensions of the present tragedy. The bellicose declarations of some experts in the early days of the war have given way to calmer analysis. In many ways, it’s high time; Kharkiv is not Kabul. Especially given the recent worrying developments in the nuclear debate.
Until relatively recently, the nuclear orthodoxy established after the cold war, as the two superpowers reduced their strategic arsenals, had placed some nuclear weapons in a kind of peripheral area of the doctrine: those known as ‘tactical’ because of their lesser power and range. From 1945 to the 1960s, they had been a key part of US war plans, especially for the European theatre. At the time, the aim was to counter the Soviet Union’s conventional superiority with overwhelming nuclear superiority, to deny the battlefield to the enemy. US secretary of state John Foster Dulles, author of the ‘massive retaliation’ doctrine, stated in 1955, ‘The United States in particular has sea and air forces now equipped with new and powerful weapons of precision which can utterly destroy military targets without endangering unrelated civilian centers’ (12). President Dwight D Eisenhower declared, ‘I see no reason why they shouldn’t be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.’
However, from the 1960s, the prospect of ‘mutual assured destruction’ reduced the likelihood that tactical nuclear weapons would be used, because of the risk of escalation. The concept of a ‘limited nuclear strike’ gradually came to be seen as dangerous sophistry. Regardless of experts who were certain that a nuclear war could be ‘won’ by ‘graduating’ one’s nuclear response, and controlling the ‘ladders of escalation’ (the best known being Herman Kahn of the Hudson Institute), even a nuclear weapon (arbitrarily) labelled as ‘tactical’ still had the potential to lead to total destruction. The works of Thomas Schelling, especially The Strategy of Conflict (1960) and Strategy and Arms Control (1961) contributed to this new awareness.
Options for US decision makers
The rejection of graduation became a distinguishing characteristic of France’s nuclear doctrine. While reserving the option of a ‘unique and non-renewable’ warning shot, President Emmanuel Macron said in February 2020 that France had always ‘refused to consider nuclear weapons as a weapon of battle.’ He also insisted that France would ‘never engage in a nuclear battle or any form of graduated response’ (13).
Prior to the 2010s, it seemed possible that other nuclear-weapon states could adopt such a doctrinal stance, coupled with the ‘minimum necessary’ nuclear arsenal (France had fewer than 300 warheads). And it was possible to believe that, with a few exceptions (such as Pakistan), tactical nuclear weapons had ‘faded into the background of military and political planning and rhetoric’ (14).
Despite scattered calls in the US for the creation of a ‘no-fly zone' over some or all of Ukraine, the Biden administration has widely resisted. In practice, this could mean shooting down Russian planes. It could lead to World War IIINina Tannenwald
But over the last decade, the trend has reversed. In the world of strategic studies, there has been a return to ‘theories of [nuclear] victory’. Their proponents draw on the work of past scholars such as Henry Kissinger, who wondered in his 1957 book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy if extending the American deterrent to all of Europe at a time when the threat of total destruction hung over the US itself would actually work: ‘A reliance on all-out war as the chief deterrent saps our system of alliances in two ways: either our allies feel that any military effort on their part is unnecessary or they may be led to the conviction that peace is preferable to war even on terms almost akin to surrender ... As the implication of all-out war with modern weapons become better understood ... it is not reasonable to assume that the United Kingdom, and even more the United States, would be prepared to commit suicide in order to defend a particular area ... whatever its importance, to an enemy’ (15).
One of the recommended solutions was to bring tactical nuclear weapons back into the dialectic of deterrence extended to allied territories, so as to give US decision makers a range of options between Armageddon and defeat without a war. Global deterrence was ‘restored’ by creating additional rungs on the ladder of escalation, which were supposed to enable a sub-apocalyptic deterrence dialogue — before one major adversary or the other felt its key interests were threatened and resorted to extreme measures. Many theorists in the 1970s took this logic further, in particular Colin Gray in a 1979 article, now back in fashion, titled ‘Nuclear Strategy: the case for a theory of victory’ (16).
Theoreticians of nuclear victory today reject the ‘paralysis’ that comes with an excessively rigid vision of deterrence. Their strategic beliefs were semi-officialised in the Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (17). What influence have these theories had on Russia? Has the Kremlin chosen to combine nuclear and conventional deterrents in an operational continuum? Whatever the case, authors who defend the idea of using tactical (‘low-yield’ or ‘ultra-low yield’) nuclear weapons emphasise the importance of countering adversaries who adopt hybrid strategies. Rogue states without a nuclear deterrent will increasingly be tempted to present a fait accompli, banking on nuclear-weapon states’ risk aversion, at least when the latter face a crisis that does not affect their own national territory.
Uncertainties of deterrence dialogue
This shows how Kissinger’s 1957 discussion of the intrinsic weaknesses of wider nuclear deterrence remains pertinent today. The benefits would be even greater for a state with a nuclear deterrent — a nuclear-weapon state behaving like a rogue state. This is exactly what Russia is doing in Ukraine. The West’s hesitation to adopt an over-vigorous response that could lead to nuclear escalation is amplified by its realisation of how history would view whichever party — aggressor or victim — became the first to break the nuclear taboo since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. International Crisis Group’s Olga Oliker admits that ‘such caution and concessions may not bring emotional satisfaction; there is certainly a visceral appeal to proposals that would have NATO forces directly help Ukraine. But these would dramatically heighten the risk that the war becomes a wider, potentially nuclear conflict. Western leaders should therefore reject them out of hand. Literally nothing else could be more dangerous.’
The ‘Third Nuclear Age’, heralded by various crises over the last decade, has dawned in Ukraine. In 2018 Admiral Pierre Vandier, now chief of staff of the French navy, offered a precise definition of this shift to the new strategic era, which has begun with Russia’s invasion: ‘A number of indicators suggest that we are entering a new era, a Third Nuclear Age, following the first, defined by mutual deterrence between the two superpowers, and the second, which raised hopes of a total and definitive elimination of nuclear weapons after the cold war’ (18).
This third age will bring new questions on the reliability — and relevance — of ‘logical rules ... painfully learned, as during the Cuban [missile] crisis’ (19). There will be questions about the rationality of new actors using their nuclear deterrents. The worth of the nuclear taboo, which some today treat as absolute, will be reappraised.
‘Unleashed power of the atom’
Questions like ‘If we refuse to use them, why do we have them?’ suggest Albert Einstein’s warning from 1946 may still be pertinent: ‘The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking.’ Yet Einstein was already wrong. Huge numbers of papers were hurriedly written to explain the balances and imbalances of the deterrence dialogue. The current usefulness of these historical, theoretical documents is highly variable, as their logic often reaches absurd conclusions. Yet they include some intelligent analyses that shed light on the Ukrainian nuclear crisis.
Columbia professor Robert Jervis (20), a pioneer of political psychology in international relations, sought to demonstrate that it was possible to overcome the security anxieties that cause each actor to see his own actions as defensive, and those of his competitor as ‘naturally’ offensive. Jervis maintained that breaking the insecurity cycle caused by this distortion meant developing exchanges of signals that would make it possible to differentiate between offensive and defensive weapons in the arsenals of one’s adversaries. And his adaptation of prospect theory to nuclear crises opens up possibilities of interpreting Russia’s behaviour differently, suggesting for example that the adoption of aggressive tactics is more often motivated by aversion to loss than by hopes of gain.
In a nuclear crisis, all strategies are sub-optimal. One, however, is worse than all the rest: claiming that the adversary’s leader is insane, while simultaneously treating the standoff as a game of chicken. This will lead either to mutual destruction or to defeat without a war. Over the past few weeks, some seem to have accepted that this worst of all possible choices is worthy of being called a strategy.
Olivier Zajec is a lecturer in political science at Jean Moulin Lyon III University’s law faculty.Translated by Charles Goulden
Image: Germán & CoCooperate with objective and ethical thinking…
Image by Le Monde Diplomatique / cc p_v a l d i v i e s oSpecial focus on natural resources
Energy: conflicts, illusions, solutions
“Reflections from Le Monde Diplomatique …
Oil, gas, coal, uranium: these words make up the language of power, and the countries that forgot it were reminded by the war in Ukraine. Today we can add solar, wind and hydrogen to this vocabulary. How much are the business sector’s green schemes worth? Will a real energy transition also require a social transformation? There is no shortage of ideas around to reconcile concerns about the end of the world with concerns about the end of the month.
Seaboard: pioneers in power generation in the country…
…“More than 32 years ago, back in January 1990, Seaboard began operations as the first independent power producer (IPP) in the Dominican Republic. They became pioneers in the electricity market by way of the commercial operations of Estrella del Norte, a 40MW floating power generation plant and the first of three built for Seaboard by Wärtsilä.
Flags are seen at Siemens Energy's site on the day of German Chancellor OIaf Scholz's visit, during which he saw a gas turbine meant to be transported to the compressor station of the Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline in Russia, in Muelheim an der Ruhr, Germany, August 3, 2022. REUTERS/Wolfgang Rattay/FILE PHOTOSiemens Energy's wind turbine troubles to last years, shares tumble
On Friday, Siemens Energy's share price took a sharp dip, marking the most significant drop since the company's spin-off from Siemens and separate listing in 2020. The sudden decline has caught the attention of many investors and analysts, who are closely monitoring the situation to see how it will impact the energy industry as a whole.
REUTERS By Sabine Wollrab, Maria Sheahan and Christoph Steitz, June 23, 2023FRANKFURT/BERLIN, June 23 (Reuters) - Siemens Energy (ENR1n.DE) had one third wiped off its market value on Friday after warning that the impact of quality problems at its Siemens Gamesa wind turbine business could cost more than 1 billion euros ($1.09 billion) and take years to fix.
The group scrapped its 2023 profit outlook late on Thursday after a review of its wind turbine division exposed deeper-than-expected problems.
"This is a disappointing and severe setback," Siemens Gamesa CEO Jochen Eickholt told journalists on a call.
"I have said several times that there is actually nothing visible at Siemens Gamesa that I have not seen elsewhere. But I have to tell you that I would not say that again today."
Siemens Energy's share price plunge on Friday was the biggest since the group was spun off from Siemens (SIEGn.DE) and separately listed in 2020.
Shares in the group, which supplies equipment and services to the power sector, were down 31.5% at 0842 GMT.
Traders and analysts said the extent of the company's latest problems was still uncertain.
"Even though it should be clear to everyone, I would like to emphasise again how bitter this is for all of us," Siemens Energy CEO Christian Bruch told journalists in a call.
Finance chief Maria Ferraro earlier told analysts that the majority of the hit would be over the next five years.
"Given the history and nature of the wind industry, the profit warning was not a complete surprise, but what surprised us was the magnitude," analysts at JPMorgan said.
Issues at Siemens Gamesa have been a drag on its parent for a long time, prompting Siemens Energy to take full control of the business earlier this month after only partially owning it for several years.
Deka Investment, a top-20 shareholder, said Siemens Energy would have to work hard to regain market confidence.
"The renewed profit warning is a bitter setback that undoes the very good work of the management team in one fell swoop," Deka Investment's Ingo Speich told Reuters.
Deepening troubles at Siemens Energy could also weigh on efforts by Siemens AG (SIEGn.DE), which still owns nearly a third of Siemens Energy and remains its largest shareholder, to divest its stake at an attractive price and exit the company.
Siemens AG declined to comment on Friday.
PROBLEMS 'SWEPT UNDER CARPET'
The discovery of faulty components at Siemens Gamesa in January had already caused a charge of nearly half a billion euros.
Eickholt said that while rotor blades and bearings were partly to blame for the turbine problems, it could not be ruled out that design issues also played a role.
Bruch also blamed the corporate culture at Siemens Gamesa, the result of a merger of the wind turbine division of Siemens and Spain's Gamesa, saying: "Too much has been swept under the carpet".
He said that the setback from the quality problems was "more severe than I thought possible". At the same time, he said he did not believe that the full takeover of Siemens Gamesa had been a mistake.
Bruch said that the company would be able to provide a more accurate estimate of the costs from the latest problems by the time it publishes its third-quarter results on Aug. 7, after a full analysis of the situation.
The US climate envoy John Kerry (left) and the French president, Emmanuel Macron, take part in a discussion during the summit in Paris on Thursday. Photograph: Ludovic Marin/EPAGovernments at Paris summit to finalise climate finance roadmap
Almost 40 leaders to present plans for overhaul of public financial institutions including World Bank
The Guardian by Fiona Harvey in Paris, 23 Jun 2023 Questions over a tax on global shipping and other big sources of greenhouse gas emissions, and how countries should go about setting up a loss and damage fund continue to be the subject of fierce discussion, as governments meet in Paris to prepare an overhaul of global development and climate finance.
Nearly 40 heads of state and government and a similar number of ministers and high-level representatives will finalise a roadmap for the reform of the world’s public finance institutions, including the World Bank, and of overseas aid and climate finance.
Governments at the two-day finance summit in Paris will now be ordered to present concrete proposals on a loss and damage fund, to be directed at the rescue and reconstruction of countries stricken by climate disaster, before the UN Cop28 climate summit this November. This must include proposals for how to fill that fund, including potential new taxes on fossil fuels.
A draft of the roadmap seen by the Guardian, dated 20 June and discussed on Thursday at the first day of the Paris summit for a new global financing pact, sets out six pages of proposals for delivery at carefully choreographed points up to September 2024. It includes items for delivery at future meetings of the G20 summit, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund annual meetings in October, Cop28 and other international meetings, up to the Summit for the Future to be held next September.
Some of these aims have already been partly achieved at the current Paris summit, hosted by the French president, Emmanuel Macron. For instance, the World Bank has agreed to start suspending debt payments for countries hit by climate disaster. However, so far these “climate resilient debt clauses” will only apply to new loan agreements, rather than being applied to existing loans.
Taxes are likely to prove a difficult point. The EU wants more countries to use emissions trading to raise funds for climate action, but some developing countries are less keen on the prospect, which they regard as complex and more suitable for use in advanced economies.
John Kerry, the special envoy for climate to the US president, Joe Biden, said the White House did not have a position on potential taxes on shipping, aviation or fossil fuels. “I support some kind of revenue raising on a broad basis, but this is not administration policy,” he told journalists, in answer to a question from the Guardian. “I personally have supported pricing carbon, but I’m not advocating a tax or a fee or anything at this point. Certainly the administration is not, but we have to find a way to find more concessionary funding.”
He also indicated that China should be a potential donor to a loss and damage fund. “You’ve got to look at this [fund] and say what’s fair, what makes sense. And people are going to ask themselves all around the world: ‘Do you think that the second largest economy in the world ought to put something into it?’ I can’t imagine people who say no, that doesn’t make sense. So that’s the kind of thing we have to work at. It’s the kind of thing we’ve got to have a discussion about.”
Absent from the draft proposals seen by the Guardian is the commitment to triple the finance available from the World Bank, which has been supported by Mia Mottley, prime minister of Barbados.
However, if the changes to the World Bank and its fellow institutions are carried out, then a significant expansion of publicly funded development banks’ ability to lend could follow.
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The proposals range from the highly detailed, including ways of sharing data on developing countries with private investors to help them draw up improved risk profiles on countries less likely to default on debt, to the broad brush, such as the launch of an independent body to facilitate links between countries and funds so that climate financing works a little more smoothly.
Experts are also asked to come up with a definition of “vulnerable countries”, to target those most at risk from the effects of the climate crisis and least able to build resilience against disaster.
Alex Scott of the E3G thinktank said: “If this [draft roadmap] is what comes out, we and campaigners would be very happy with this. It is a concrete roadmap that would be a clear and credible sign that this agenda for solving problems with the financial system is on its way. It sets actions governments have to take, and there are lots of ideas in here that are needed.”