News round-up, Wednesday, March 1, 2023

Quote of the day…

“The rest of the world’s rajahs are saying coal must stop,” said Pradhan. “But we are the rajah of our own country.”

Washington Post

Most read…

China predicts new arms race

Japan abandons its old strategy of pacifism

Japan has announced a massive increase in its military spending, which will allow it to project its power region-wide in response to China’s ‘strategic challenge’. Its neighbours aren’t happy.

Le Monde Diplomatique by Jordan Pouille

The Special Tribunal Debate"An Arrest Warrant against Putin Would Be Immense"

In the debate in Berlin over Ukraine, many are concerned that by supplying weapons, Germany has become party to the war. In an interview, international law expert Claus Kress dispels false arguments and discusses how Russian President Vladimir Putin could be brought to justice.

Spiegel, Interview Conducted by Ralf Neukirch and Rafael Buschmann

In India, ‘phase down’ of coal actually means rapid expansion of mining

A tripling of size is planned at the fastest-growing coal mine in India

WP by Karishma Mehrotra


Hoping to make India a supply base for our global energy storage needs: Julian Nebreda CEO of Fluence
 

The company's 150 MWh BESS will be commissioned by July-August in Karnataka.

MONEYCONTROL.COM BY SWETA GOSWAMI & RACHITA PRASAD

”We’ll need natural gas for years…

but can start blending it with green hydrogen today, AES CEO, Andrés Gluski says…


 

Image by Le Monde Diplomatique: Intelligence-gathering mission: troops listen to a speech by defence minister Taro Kono in Naha, southern Japan, 11 January 2020

China predicts new arms race

Japan abandons its old strategy of pacifism

Japan has announced a massive increase in its military spending, which will allow it to project its power region-wide in response to China’s ‘strategic challenge’. Its neighbours aren’t happy.

Le Monde Diplomatique by Jordan Pouille

Kyodo News · Getty

On 27 November 2021 prime minister Fumio Kishida visited Camp Asaka, the Ground Self Defense Force (Japanese army) base north of Tokyo. He told the troops, ‘I will consider all options [for strengthening Japan’s defence capabilities], including a so-called enemy base strike capability ... The security environment surrounding Japan is changing at an unprecedented pace. Things that used to happen only in science fiction novels have become reality.’ Last December Kishida announced plans to double Japan’s defence budget to $315bn over five years, making it the world’s third largest after those of the US and China, and equivalent to 2% of GDP, in line with the NATO target.

These announcements, which fall within the framework of a new National Security Strategy released last August, have radically changed the armed forces’ remit: they will no longer be limited to defending Japan but will have the means to counterattack, and even neutralise military bases in unfriendly countries.

This hardly comes as a surprise. Last August Itsunori Onodera, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)’s national security research committee chairman, who is close to Kishida and served as defence minister under his predecessor Shinzo Abe, led a wargame with Taku Otsuka, an LDP member of the House of Representatives (the lower house of Japan’s National Diet), to determine what Japan should do if China invaded Taiwan. The Nikkei Asia’sdiplomatic correspondent Moriyasu Ken said, ‘They talked about what to do if China simultaneously invaded Taiwan and the Senkaku Islands [also claimed by China as the Diaoyu Islands]. “Oh my goodness, what should we do? Should we start by evacuating Japanese nationals from Taiwan? Do we have time to help the Americans with Taiwan?” It was total chaos. Eventually, they thought it would be best to focus on the Senkakus.’

At the time, the atmosphere in Japan was tense. A couple of days after US House speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, five ballistic missiles launched by the Chinese military during exercises around Taiwan landed inside Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Ken said, ‘China clearly wants to test the US-Japan alliance over the next few years. Washington’s official position is that the slightest attack on Japanese territory — say on Yonaguni Island [just 100km east of Taiwan, at the tip of the Okinawa archipelago] would be equivalent to dropping a bomb on New York.In practice, it’s not that clear-cut.’

What the Japanese know

From satellite surveillance, Japan knows the Chinese military have been training in the Gobi desert for an attack on an air base, using a mock-up of the US base at Kadena, in Okinawa. Masashi Murano of the Hudson Institute thinktank in Washington believes they would first neutralise the Kadena base if they invaded Taiwan. They would ‘[neutralise] airstrip networks in Okinawa and Kyushu early in the conflict with a salvo of ballistic and cruise missiles, along with cyber and electromagnetic disruption campaigns’ (1). The US insists that its 30,000-strong military presence in Okinawa is vital, if only to protect local residents. Last October the US ambassador to Tokyo visited the Marine Corp’s Camp Hansen to open a farmers’ market, as a source of fresh produce for military families. That may not be enough to win over the local population, who mostly oppose US bases.

A recent Japanese defence ministry white paper describes China as an ‘unprecedented strategic challenge’ and a competitor, disrupting the region’s geopolitical and military balance and threatening the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan, which Japan insists it willdefend (after occupying it from 1895 to 1945) (2). Also identified as adversaries are North Korea, which test-fired intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) near Japan throughout 2022, and since the invasion of Ukraine, Russia. Japan’s dispute with Russia over the Kuril Islands, which the Soviet Union annexed at the end of the second world war, is still unresolved.

The security environment surrounding Japan is changing at an unprecedented pace. Things that used to happen only in science fiction novels have become realityFumio Kishida

However, public opinion is by no means unanimously behind the new strategy. Ken says China has indeed increased its defence budget (by 7.1% or $229bn in 2022, compared with $768bn for the US) but believes ‘Xi Jinping didn’t strengthen his grip on power in order to make war — he did it because he’s getting ready to introduce measures to combat inequality that will be very unpopular ... with China’s wealthy, who behave like Saudi princes, with their Lamborghinis and villas in California. Xi wants Taiwan to reunite with China of its own volition, and nothing suggests that he plans to invade. A war on Taiwan will only drain China’s economy as China doesn’t have oil like Russia does, so they can’t afford to do anything silly. Xi hasn’t out ruled military intervention, but his core message is of a return to the roots of communism,’ which, according to Xi, is incompatible with war.

What the LDP’s opponents criticise most is the scale of the increase in military spending and the new strategy’s offensive element. Japan remains attached to the pacifist constitution the US imposed after it surrendered in 1945 and especially to article nine, which states: ‘The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes ... In order to accomplish [this aim], land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.’

Regular pacifist protests

Pacifist defenders of this principle regularly demonstrate outside the Diet building in Tokyo. One afternoon in mid-November I watched 6,000 protestors, a few with megaphones, face Japanese police equipped with little plastic speaking trumpets. Everyone remained behind lines painted on the ground and police tape. One charity worker had pockets full of pamphlets with slogans such as ‘Peace cannot be achieved by force’, ‘Military expansion is a one-way street’ and ‘Don’t let our islands become a fortress’. He was disappointed that most of the demonstrators were elderly.

‘Young people here are quite insular. Very few speak a foreign language,’ said a doctor from a large hospital in the university quarter of Gotanda.‘They live in a vacuum, focussed on their own day-to-day concerns. They aren’t aware of the real external threats. They agree with the government when it says we need to increase our defence capabilities, but tell themselves that, at the end of the day, our big strong US allies will save us.’ A youth planning to study law said that although he understood the government’s position in wanting to help the US protect Taiwan, ‘Japan’s young people won’t want to fight. Helping the Americans see off the Chinese is not for us.’ Although Japan doesn’t have compulsory military service, he could see himself joining the Self Defense Forces as a reservist: ‘If the Chinese invade Taiwan, Okinawa will be next, then Kyushu. We’ll have to defend ourselves.’

The Japanese and their government see the US as the lynchpin of national security. Kimitoshi Morihara, executive committee member in charge of foreign affairs for the Japanese Communist Party (which won 7.6% of the vote in the 2021 House of Representatives election), told me the LDP ‘don’t care’ whether Japan makes its own decisions and ‘feel no shame about being the junior partner in the alliance with the US. However, one success of long-standing propaganda by the LDP is that half the population blames the constitution for being “US-made”, written and imposed by US to strip Japan of the right to have an army ... they claim. Nationalists do care about the fact Japan cannot show its power by sending troop abroad like other prosperous countries.’

When the Communists (passionate defenders of constitutional pacifism and fiercely opposed to the new defence strategy and the US nuclear umbrella) hold a big meeting, their headquarters in Tokyo’s Sendagaya district is guarded by police. The day I met Morihara, buses filled with far-right ultra-nationalists kept driving past, with Japanese Imperial standards and Ukrainian flags fastened to their sides, broadcasting propaganda through loudspeakers.

Threats to Japan

The Japanese press talk of rallying to the US cause as if it were the obvious thing to do. Onodera says Russia invaded Ukraine believing it was a weak nation with no one to defend it: ‘Japan will not be attacked if it is strong and has allies to defend it’ (3). It’s an old saw spread overseas by Keio University professor Tomohiko Taniguchi, former speechwriter and foreign policy advisor to Abe. Last November, Taniguchi was invited to address both Asia Society Switzerland and the Council of Europe’s World Forum for Democracy in Europe, in Strasbourg. Just before that, I heard him lecture at Keio University, in Tokyo. His message was impassioned: ‘Russia, North Korea, China... Never before has Japan faced three hostile nuclear powers in series, three non-democratic countries. This coincides with the fact that our country is ageing, its population is shrinking, and the economy is not growing fast enough. It’s almost impossible for Japan alone to grow as fast as China to counterbalance its power. The only rational option would be for Japan to work closely with likeminded peers, such as our long-standing ally the US, but also with Australia and India. And increasingly with European countries, especially France, because it has the world’s largest EEZ after the US, thanks to its territories in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.’

The fact is Japan is a US client state — militarily, economically and diplomaticallyKimitoshi Morihara

Taniguchi referred to the Indo-Pacific alliance, which Abe described in a 2007 speech to the Indian parliament on need to counter China’s growing military strength (4). Abe spoke of a ‘broader Asia’ spanning the whole Pacific, including Australia and the US. Morihara explained that this would be ‘an axis of democracies allied with the US against China. So when Japan acquires powerful long-range missiles as “deterrents” to China, these will be integrated into the US’s Indo-Pacific defence strategy. Washington will never allow us to use them independently: the fact is Japan is a US client state — militarily, economically and diplomatically.’To reduce this asymmetry, the Japanese government has, however, agreed to jointly develop a fighter aircraft with Italy and the UK by 2035 (5).

A dangerous development

Japan’s new closer relationship with the US echoes the security treaty signed in 1951, at the end of the US occupation. The official Chinese press see it as a dangerous development. Sino-Japanese relations deteriorated sharply in 2012, after the Japanese government bought three of the Senkaku Islands from their private (Japanese) owner, and Chinese naval incursions into their territorial waters became more frequent (6). Abe’s regular visits to Yasukuni Shrine, dedicated to the 2.5 million Japanese who died in the second world war, including some convicted war criminals, did not help.

Things have been calmer in recent years. Following Abe’s assassination last July, Xi even stated that they had ‘reached [an] important consensus’ on building ‘China-Japan relations that meet the requirements of the new era’ (7). But since Japan announced its new defence strategy, the tone has changed. The daily Global Times, which closely follows the Chinese government line, said, ‘Given the devastation caused by Japan’s prior defence and military upgrading in history, particularly during WWII, the present policy change will have an impact on the whole area, as many nations will have to raise their military spending, leading to a new arms race in Northeast Asia’ (8).

China is not alone in being concerned about the new policy. South Korea has bitter memories of Japanese occupation from 1910 to 1945. Old disputes are resurfacing, including the matter of ‘comfort women’ — Korean women forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese army. The historical facts are disputed by war crime deniers, whose numbers in Japan are rising. Since 2017 the governor of Tokyo has refused to attend the annual commemoration of the 1923 massacre of at least 2,600 Korean immigrants falsely accused by the Japanese population(with police and army backing) of having poisoned wells and planned violence in the aftermath of an earthquake that killed 100,000 and destroyed much of Tokyo and Yokohama. The government has recently increased the budget for ‘strategic dissemination of information overseas’ (9), channelling some of it through thinktanks tasked with conveying ‘the historical truth about Japan’.

Korea’s main concern relates to the fact that Japan is clearly envisaging the possibility of using its ‘counterstrike’ capabilities to ‘attack enemy bases’, including those of North Korea — since South Korea would then face a direct threat. The South Korean centrist daily Hankyoreh asked, ‘How are we supposed to accept this reality in which Japan designates the Korean Peninsula — constitutionally our sovereign territory [under article 3 of South Korea’s constitution] — as a target for pre-emptive strikes? (10)’Even South Korea’s conservative president Yoon Suk-yeol, who is keen to build closer relations with the US and Japan, distanced himself: ‘In matters that directly affect the security of the Korean Peninsula, or our national interest, it is clear that we must be closely consulted or that our prior consent must be sought’ (11).

There is nothing to suggest that North Korea is impressed by Japan’s threats. President Kim Jong-un regularly orders test launches of ICBMs, which land in Japan’s EEZ, off Hokkaido, more than 1,000km from their launch site. But according to Morihara, the aim is not really to intimidate Japan: ‘The North Koreans are desperate to talk to the US.Theyhave an insatiable need for attention.’ Though the Self Defense Forces don’t attempt to shoot down the missiles, the Japanese people are kept informed of the threat via their smartphones and information displays on subway and bullet trains (with apologies for the delay to their journey). The authorities also keep Japanese cryptocurrency companies informed of threats from the Lazarus Group, North Korea’s largest hacking organisation. Japan’s talks with North Korea, like those of the US, are currently deadlocked.

Though Russia is now a designated foe, that was not always the case. During his first term of office (2012-20), Abe played five rounds of golf with Donald Trump but met Vladimir Putin 27 times; there were many promises of economic cooperation, though no agreement to resolve the Kuril Island dispute. The islands form a barrier between the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Okhotsk, patrolled by Russian nuclear submarines; in 2016 Russia deployed a coastal missile system on the islands. It would see handing them back to a US ally as diminishing its own security.

Strategic partnership with Russia

Though Kishida backed sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine, he has maintained a strategic partnership with Russia on energy. Unlike ExxonMobil, Japanese investors have kept their stakes in Russian offshore gas exploration and production company Sakhalin-2. Japan buys around 60% of the 10 million tonnes of liquefied natural gas the company produces, meeting 10% of its energy needs. Kishida emphasises that Sakhalin-2’s gas and oil fields in the Sea of Okhotsk are extremely important for Japan’s energy security.

In Asia, Japan’s new defence strategy may damage trade relations with neighbours on which it is heavily reliant. In 2008 Japan signed a free trade agreement with the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries (12), helping Japanese manufacturers to offshore production. Asics has made most of its sports shoes in Cambodia since 2013; Sony has a Home Cinema System factory in Malaysia; Mitsubishi has acquired two companies that provide consumer loans via smartphone apps, in Indonesia and the Philippines, to make it easier for customers in those countries to buy its locally built cars. There are also some surprising cultural links: the city of Itami in Hyogo Prefecture recently donated an organ to St Joseph’s Cathedral in Hanoi, Vietnam. Japan is now the second largest foreign investor in Vietnam, after Singapore, and the largest importer of seafood from Vietnam.

This can sometimes lead to Japan supporting countriesthat are in difficulties on the international scene. Last October it abstained on a UN Human Rights Council resolution on alleged human rights violations by Sri Lanka. Japan is Sri Lanka’s second largest creditor after China. In return, the Sri Lankan authorities muted its response in March 2021, when Wishma Sandamali, a university graduate and English teacher in her home country who had entered Japan on a student visa planning to teach English to children in Japan, died in her cell at an immigration detention centre in Nagoya after being denied adequate medical care. She had been held for several months after it was discovered that her visa had expired when she visited a local police station to file a complaint about domestic violence.

Unlike the ASEAN countries, India has not attracted Japanese investors keen to build factories. Megha Wadhwa, a visiting fellow at Sofia University in Tokyo, notes that ‘these two nations do not have a history of serious conflict and yet ... their relationship has never risen above the level of lukewarm’ (13), even though many Indians are working in Japan. Thousands of English-speaking IT engineers have joined Japanese startups on ‘technical intern training’ visas, an immigration scheme designed to help small and medium enterprises bypass Japan’s zero-immigration policy. According to Wadhwa, ‘Indian migrants have definitely contributed to creating awareness about India in Japan and Japan in India. Over the years, India has become the IT country, one of the upcoming powers [whereas in the past] it was just about curry, snakes and Ayurveda.’ Japan and India also have a joint space programme that aims to explore the far side of the moon by 2030 — to compete with China, which landed a robotic spacecraft there in 2019.

‘It’s not necessarily high-tech’

Although Japan has aligned itself with the US strategic vision, it is affected by the US’s economic sanctions against China. Sony, which dominates the global market for CMOS image sensors used in smartphone cameras, can no longer sell them to Huawei. Yet Japan is still a bellwether of what the Chinese middle class are likely to buy.

‘And it’s not necessarily high-tech. If it does well in Japan — design, packaging, fashion, cosmetics, you name it — then Chinese consumers, and consumers in Taiwan, Korea and Thailand, will want it too. That’s a given,’ said Jérôme Chouchan, chairman of the French chamber of commerce and president of chocolate maker Godiva’s Japan and South Korea operations. Casual wear retailer Uniqlo is a striking example: of its 1,600 stores worldwide, 900 are in China, where it has been opening up to a hundred more each year. The company’s owner Tadashi Yanai, 73, is Japan’s richest person with an estimated net worth of $28bn, and keeps the Chinese government sweet by not getting involved in geopolitics or other divisive issues.

Since Hong Kong and its hedge funds lost their shine for foreign and even wealthy Chinese investors, the Japanese government has been trying to improve Tokyo’s attractiveness as a financial centre through tax incentives. It is still lagging some way behind Singapore, but the government hopes it will be a fallback for Western entrepreneurs who once saw China as the Asian Eldorado. Jack Ma, former boss of Alibaba, seems happy there.

By suddenly turning its back on pacifism, Japan has put itself at odds with China, which already has a strong presence across the region. Many Asian countries are reluctant to choose between China and the US (which promises to protect them). What will be their attitude towards Tokyo now?

Jordan Pouille

Seaboard: pioneers in power generation in the country

…Armando Rodríguez, vice-president and executive director of the company, talks to us about their projects in the DR, where they have been operating for 32 years.

More than 32 years ago, back in January 1990, Seaboard began operations as the first independent power producer (IPP) in the Dominican Republic. They became pioneers in the electricity market by way of the commercial operations of Estrella del Norte, a 40MW floating power generation plant and the first of three built for Seaboard by Wärtsilä.


 
Image: Germán & Co

The Special Tribunal Debate"An Arrest Warrant against Putin Would Be Immense"

In the debate in Berlin over Ukraine, many are concerned that by supplying weapons, Germany has become party to the war. In an interview, international law expert Claus Kress dispels false arguments and discusses how Russian President Vladimir Putin could be brought to justice.

Spiegel, Interview Conducted by Ralf Neukirch and Rafael Buschmann

About Claus Kress

Claus Kress, 56, is a professor of international law and criminal law and the director of the Institute of International Peace and Security Law at the University of Cologne. He previously served as a member of the German government delegation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) negotiations. He is a judge ad hoc at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case against the government of Myanmar for alleged genocide against the Rohingya ethnic group.

DER SPIEGEL: Professor Kress, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has justified his long hesitation in supplying Leopard tanks to Ukraine by saying that he wanted to prevent Germany from becoming a party to the war. Under international law, do we become a party to war by sending increasingly powerful weapons?

Kress: For a long time, I had the impression that German policy was hiding behind international law. The legal situation is clear: Germany is allowed to help Ukraine defend itself. Germany would actually be allowed to do even more.

DER SPIEGEL: What do you mean by that?

Kress: On the basis of the right to collective self-defense, Germany could intervene directly in the conflict alongside Ukraine. The question at the center of the German debate, "war party, yes or no," has nothing whatsoever to do with the question regarding the extent to which Germany may support Ukraine. It is a political determination, and one which can be easily politically justified.

DER SPIEGEL: The kinds of weapons that Germany supplies to Ukraine is irrelevant under international law?

Kress: I was disturbed by the fact that German politicians gave currency to the idea that Germany could violate international law by supplying weapons – and that this in turn would entitle Russia to take action against Germany. That is wrong so long as Ukraine is using these weapons for defense, which is allowed.

DER SPIEGEL: At what point would Germany become a party to the war?

Kress: The question should be asked on the basis of the prohibition of violence and the right to self-defense: At what point does supporting Ukraine's individual self-defense become a use of force by Germany requiring the invoking of the collective right of self-defense? This would certainly be the case if Germany deployed its own soldiers – if, for example, the German air force or German tanks manned by German soldiers were deployed in Ukraine. Then Germany would also be a party to the war.

DER SPIEGEL: The U.S. has reportedly transmitted the coordinates of Russian ammunition depots and barracks on Ukrainian soil to Kyiv. Does that cross the line?

Kress: Involvement in the planning of concrete Ukrainian military operations could become a tipping point.

DER SPIEGEL: What consequences might that have?

Kress: The exercise of the right of collective self-defense would have to be reported to the UN Security Council. Such a letter, though, would likely be just as politically undesirable as the status of war party that would also then be implied. But again: There is no doubt about the permissibility of the collective defense of Ukraine under international law. If Russia were to respond to such collective self-defense with military attacks against targets aimed at the defenders, it would again violate the prohibition on the use of force.

"The unleashing of the war of aggression is the original sin that opened the door for all further evils."

DER SPIEGEL: A discussion is currently underway over how to prosecute those responsible for the war of aggression. Why is that so difficult? The International Criminal Court is investigating war crimes and crimes against humanity – and possibly genocide as well.

Kress: These investigations cover a significant part of the injustice; they are very important. But without the crime of aggression, a central dimension is omitted: The decision by the Russian leadership to start this war, thus trampling on the prohibition against the use of force under international law. The unleashing of this war of aggression is the original sin that opened the door for all further evils. This includes the countless killings of Ukrainian soldiers in combat, which cannot be prosecuted as war crimes. Unlike other crimes under international law, the International Criminal Court's own statutes unfortunately prohibit it from investigating the suspected crime of aggression in this case.

DER SPIEGEL: So, it would primarily be about the political dimension?

Kress: For the direct victims of aggression, it is surely of fundamental importance to hold the perpetrators of such a war responsible. But there's more at stake: It is imperative that the prohibition against the use of force under international law be confirmed for the future. After Germany's aggression during World War II, the Americans, and indeed the Soviet Union, pushed to use the Nuremberg trial to set a strong international precedent against wars of aggression in the future.

DER SPIEGEL: Which Russian officials would likely be the focus of a special tribunal focused on crimes of aggression?

Kress: The focus would be Russia's leadership circle. This could also include those who, without a relevant post under the constitution, have a significant influence on the planning, preparation, initiation and/or execution of the war of aggression.

DER SPIEGEL: People like Yevgeny Prigozhin, for example, the head of the private mercenary unit known as the Wagner Group?

Kress: If the investigation were to substantiate the suspicion that he had a say in the aggression, then he would be among those who would have to answer to a special tribunal.

DER SPIEGEL: Still, it seems rather unrealistic that the leadership cadre surrounding Vladimir Putin will ever have to face an international court.

Kress: From today's perspective, it seems rather unlikely. Because for that to happen, Putin and his adherents would have to show up at the trial, and they won't do that. But there could be a change of government in Russia at some point. If the new people in power then wanted to come to terms with the injustice committed, the arrest and deportation of suspects could become a possibility.

DER SPIEGEL: There is nothing to indicate that such a thing might happen.

Kress: This was also said frequently before the trials of Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić over the Yugoslav war. But things turned out differently. Incidentally, international investigations alone would send an important message to the international community. And what symbolic power would an arrest warrant and a well-substantiated, publicly accessible indictment against Putin and Co. have? It would be immense!

DER SPIEGEL: A few days ago, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock proposed the establishment of a kind of hybrid special tribunal. What do you think of the idea?

Kress: Not much.

DER SPIEGEL: Please explain?

Kress: The "hybrid" court that the minister has in mind would not be an international court. It would be a Ukrainian court located in The Hague, and it would administer Ukrainian law. And there would be a risk that it would end in disappointment.

DER SPIEGEL: Why?

Kress: Under current international law, Putin would enjoy immunity as acting head of state in a tribunal that is essentially Ukrainian. How do you intend to convince the Ukrainian people of the utility of establishing a tribunal at considerable expense that cannot even take action against the primary suspect Moreover, a tribunal must send an effective message reaffirming the universal ban on violence. But such a message can only be sent by an international tribunal that is part of the Nuremberg tradition and applies the international definition of aggression.

DER SPIEGEL: Baerbock has a master's degree in international law. What do you think of the fact that she, of all people, favors the hybrid model?

Kress: I suspect there are political reasons, not least the closing of ranks with France and Britain. Both are in favor of the "hybrid" model.

DER SPIEGEL: Is it possible that Paris and London don't want to see the crime of aggression prosecuted because they themselves have waged wars of aggression?

Kress: I fear it is because the governments of these two countries do not want a strong international precedent against aggression that would put them on the spot themselves in the future. Both governments have so far refused to subject their own use of military force to international scrutiny. These countries do not object to legal action against the crime of aggression, as long as it is directed at the Russians. But the uncomfortable thing about international criminal law is precisely that it must be applied to everyone. That, by the way, is precisely the promise made by the American prosecutor Robert Jackson at the opening of the Nuremberg trials.

"The question of the West's credibility is unfortunately justified, especially when it comes to crimes of aggression."

DER SPIEGEL: You advocate an international tribunal against those responsible in Russia. But the Global South is certain to point out that the West is quick to use international law when it comes to condemning others, but is wary of submitting to international jurisprudence itself.

Kress: The question of the West's credibility is unfortunately justified, especially when it comes to crimes of aggression. That's why a two-pronged strategy should be adopted, one that entails saying: Now we will set up a special court because we need to send the message quickly under international law in this dramatic emergency. At the same time, the loophole in the statute of the International Criminal Court, which is unprincipled, must be closed for the future. This is, to be sure, a process that will take time. But Minister Baerbock already spoke out in The Hague in favor of addressing it.

DER SPIEGEL: How do you propose establishing legitimacy for an international tribunal?

Kress: There is a clear model for this: The United Nations and Ukraine conclude a treaty. That treaty shall be concluded by the secretary-general on behalf of the UN upon request by the UN General Assembly.

DER SPIEGEL: Some claim that only the UN Security Council, in which Russia has a veto, is entitled to do so.

Kress: That's not a convincing argument. Hans Corell, the long-time legal adviser to the United Nations, has strongly affirmed that the General Assembly can participate in the establishment of an international tribunal as described. Here, too, alleged doubts about international law serve to camouflage a lack of political will.

DER SPIEGEL: There is also a political argument against this tribunal: It is unclear whether the support of a majority of countries can be found for it.

Kress: I'm not in favor of setting up a special tribunal at any price. I am only in favor of this if a convincing majority can be won for it in the General Assembly. So far, however, no attempt has been made to try to assemble such a majority. Lacking such an attempt, references to the high majority hurdle seem like a prophecy designed to be self-fulfilling.

DER SPIEGEL: It would help if you had the most important European partners, namely the French and the British, on your side.

Kress: Yes, but Germany is also allowed to take the lead for once in the service of a good cause. That is the position taken by the German government in the last 25 years in negotiations over the crime of aggression, always with a view to Germany's special historical responsibility. Incidentally, Europe would by no means be alone in taking this next step. Among most Europeans who have participated in the discussion intensively so far, there is strong support for an international special tribunal as part of the two-pronged strategy just outlined. Twelve European and non-European states, including Ukraine, recently expressed their support in a paper.

DER SPIEGEL: It has now taken German politicians almost a year to even come up with a position. What is your assessment of that hesitation?

Kress: I didn't understand it. It was basically clear on February 24, 2022, the day of the unleashing of the war of aggression: The crime of aggression must now be placed on the international agenda. Unfortunately, this crime not only played no role in German politics, but also in Western politics as a whole in the long run-up to the war of aggression.

DER SPIEGEL: What would that have changed?

Kress: Even someone like Putin is interested in ensuring that his international reputation doesn't plunge into the deepest abyss. There is a difference between just sending out the message that a war of aggression against Ukraine would be a political mistake and saying that it would be a crime under international law. Generally speaking, if the criminalization of aggression under international law is to gain preventive relevance in the medium and long term, then it must be addressed at the international level just as consistently as genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

DER SPIEGEL: At some point, the end of the war will have to be negotiated. Is it possible to conduct such negotiations with a president that you also want to bring to court?

Kress: International criminal law does not ignore the painful dilemmas of international relations. Humanitarian or political reasons may force one to say that criminal law must now take a back seat.

 

Cooperate with objective and ethical thinking…


Image: An overview of the Bhubaneswari coal mine in Angul district in the Indian state of Odisha 

In India, ‘phase down’ of coal actually means rapid expansion of mining

A tripling of size is planned at the fastest-growing coal mine in India

WP by Karishma Mehrotra

TALCHER, India — Pungent fumes wafted from the deep pit that cuts across the landscape like a small, blackened version of the Grand Canyon. Trucks with sooty cargo rumbled along roads snaking toward the rim, far in the hazy distance.

Dibyajiban Si pointed excitedly at a map. Soon, this vast canyon — the fastest-growing coal mine in India — will stretch even farther into the surrounding plains.

“It will expand beyond this horizon. … This is the fastest excavation of 300 million tons in India,” said Si, the project manager of the Bhubaneswari mine. “Whatever targets they give us, we achieve it ahead of time.”

Here in eastern India, the Bhubaneswari mine is a testament to India’s vast coal reserves, among the largest in the world. The mine’s rapid expansion also is vivid evidence that the world’s second-largest consumer of coal is not ready to give it up, despite urgent concerns about the toll its use is taking on the climate. If anything, India’s coal production is accelerating, according to Coal Ministry data.

At the 2021 global climate forum in Glasgow known as COP26, India publicly promised a “phase down” of coal. But that doesn’t actually mean that India will use less — only that it will gradually generate a smaller proportion of its overall energy with coal. In absolute terms, the country expects its coal production and consumption to expand dramatically as its energy needs skyrocket in the coming decades because of economic growth.

In recent years, the Indian government has reopened old coal mines, carved out new ones, and, perhaps most telling, extended contracts to private mining companies for longer periods, suggesting that the country’s leaders won’t be ready to give up coal for at least 25 years, government officials and coal industry executives say.

“Our energy needs are first and foremost. The share of other sectors like renewable energy is not keeping up with our energy demand. Therefore, our dependence on coal is established,” Indian Coal Secretary Amrit Lal Meena said in an interview. “Whatever we produce is consumed. Every coal mine matters.”

The country committed itself last year at COP27 in Egypt to rely on fossil fuels for no more than half of its power capacity by 2030. But the share of electricity generated using sources other than fossil fuels has not increased for more than a decade and remains below a fifth of total power generation, according to data from the Power Ministry.

“When you take a step back and ask, ‘Is renewable energy [hitting] the targets?’ The answer is, unfortunately, no,” said Rahul Tongia, the author of the book “The Future of Coal in India.” “The backstop remains coal, even more so.”

The Indian government has set a target of producing 1 billion tons of coal in fiscal 2024, which ends in March 2024, up from 700 million tons produced so far in the current fiscal year ending next month. It is urging mining companies to excavate coal as quickly as possible because electricity demand is projected to soar. India is still connecting millions of remote homes to the power grid and, over the next two decades, expects to add as much new power generation as the amount now used by the entire European Union, according to the Paris-based International Energy Agency.

“Keep it in the ground is a very Western concept,” said Rohit Chandra, an assistant professor at the Indian Institute of Technology in New Delhi who studies energy. “New renewable energy can only supply part of this growth for now. … We are decades away from coal playing an insignificant role in India’s power system.”

Pressure to accelerate mining

The Bhubaneswari mining site, near the town of Talcher, is estimated to contain 1 billion tons of relatively shallow coal, beyond the 300 million tons being excavated. The government plans over the next 25 years to triple the size of the mine to 3,700 acres and swallowing up 17 adjacent villages in the process. At the current rate of mining, the coal should last 35 years.

The government in 2011 awarded a 15-year extraction contract to Essel Mining, part of the Aditya Birla conglomerate. This was a new approach in India, and it has since then become much more common, with the government seeking to hasten coal production by turning operations at publicly owned mines over to private companies, mostly under 25-year contracts. Companies also have been given permission to own mines themselves, furthering the privatization of the sector.

After the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic, when fuel supplies at Indian power plants ran low, the government gave the coal industry even more incentive to ramp up production by easing regulations.

A worker monitors the loading of coal onto a train near the Bhubaneswari mine on Feb. 1. (Rebecca Conway for The Washington Post)

At the Bhubaneswari mine, public officials and company executives say there is palpable pressure from the government to accelerate extraction operations. “The pressure is coming,” said Si, the project manager, a mustachioed man wearing a white hard-hat. He added, “As long as there is demand, we have to take it out. And that will remain for at least 20, 30 years.”

During colonial times, India’s British rulers ran three mines in the Talcher area. After Indian independence in 1947, there was little coal exploration in the surrounding area, now known as Odisha state, and only in recent years did it become a site of renewed mining activity.

Today, officials in New Delhi, the Indian capital, are enthusiastic about the Bhubaneswari mine because of its immense size and the easy access to its shallow — albeit low-quality — coal. In the surrounding villages, residents boast that they can dig two feet to find coal, which they call “fire stone” in the local language.

Outside the nearby Hingula mine, villagers frequent a temple built around a fire from an underground source, said by believers to be the Hindu goddess Hingula herself. Other locals say the fire is most likely the result of coal being exposed to oxygen and spontaneously igniting.

“It’s the natural gift of this place,” said Rajinder Singh Malhotra, an Essel Mining executive in Odisha.

A villager in an abandoned building in the village of Hensmul, which remains partially inhabited while residents wait to be relocated so the land can be absorbed into the Bhubaneswari coal mine. (Rebecca Conway for The Washington Post)

Lives and livelihoods tied to coal

Indian officials say they have no option but to mine. While energy companies have begun investing in renewable sources, the amount of funding is not nearly enough to make a substantial dent in the use of fossil fuel. And although India is the world’s third-largest emitter of carbon in absolute terms, it is one of the lowest emitters per capita and bears little responsibility for the past century’s emissions, which have been pumped into the atmosphere mostly by industrialized countries, officials note.

Moreover, coal mining is essential to the livelihoods of many thousands of Indians. “Talcher’s mines are now at their heyday of productivity,” said Suravee Nayak, a researcher with the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research who is from the Talcher region and has focused on coal mining there for a decade. “The local communities’ futures for generations are very much entangled with the existence of the coal mines.”

Around Talcher, many of the public buildings were constructed by Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. (MCL), a state-affiliated company that owns much of the region’s mines. Schools and hospitals often bear its logo. Most of the workers in the area are employed in the mines or in businesses that support the mines and their labor force. Everyone says living standards have risen since mining arrived, driving economic growth evident in plush hotels and glass-walled restaurants.

Of course, there is also the mining dust.

“But no one wants the dust to end. The day the dust settles, that means the mines have died down,” said Soubhagya Pradhan, a Talcher-based retired union official and MCL employee. “The day the mines die down, that’s the day our home stoves will also die down.”

There is no doubt that coal mining over the past decade has taken a toll on many villagers and their surroundings. At the hamlet of Arakhpal, because of the dust, the palm trees have turned black and farming has ceased. Locals complain about new illnesses. And Arakhpal is about to lose 100 acres of land to the mine, adding more families to the 12,000 that Nayak, the think tank researcher, says have lost land to mining in the Talcher area. But mining still has wide support.

“Our national resource is coal. My land is only six feet deep. Whatever is below is the government’s. The quicker you take it, the better,” said Dinabandhu Pradhan, the head of the Arakhpal village government.

Unlike many villagers near mines elsewhere in India, almost all of the residents interviewed in the Talcher area say they actually wish more of their land was taken for the mine. They complain that the land with which they have been left is no longer arable and that they deserve the new employment and compensation that further acquisitions would offer.

In the village of Hensmul, which is perched on a long peninsula jutting into the pit with a panoramic view of the canyon below, residents say they will not move until promises of new homes and compensation are fulfilled. But, even there, villagers say coal is a source of national pride.

Pradhan says it is not up to foreign leaders — which he called “rajahs,” or rulers — to tell India what to do with its resources.

“The rest of the world’s rajahs are saying coal must stop,” said Pradhan. “But we are the rajah of our own country.”


Image: Fluence

Hoping to make India a supply base for our global energy storage needs: Julian Nebreda CEO of Fluence 

The company's 150 MWh BESS will be commissioned by July-August in Karnataka.

MONEYCONTROL.COM BY SWETA GOSWAMI & RACHITA PRASAD
FEBRUARY 24, 2023 

The joint venture (JV) between ReNew, one of India’s largest renewable energy companies, and Fluence Energy, a US-based energy storage and digital applications company, is going to scale up the manufacture of battery energy storage systems (BESS) in India, said Julian Nebreda, President and CEO, Fluence.

In an interaction with Moneycontrol, Nebreda and Jan Teichmann, Regional President, APAC, at Fluence, said the JV will focus on localising products related to BESS in India as well as in other countries.

Fluence is a global leader in energy storage and digital applications for renewables, and the JV with ReNew was firmed up last December.

Our plan is to localise all our products in India. Probably by the end of 2024, we would have done the majority of product localisation of energy storage systems. The localisation of batteries, however, will be subject to the availability of local supplies. But, hopefully by 2026-2027, depending on how battery manufacturing capabilities get built in India, we will have 100 percent localisation of products,” said Nebreda.

Teichmann explained that Fluence would be responsible for the product and engineering knowhow in the JV, and ReNew will be responsible for the renewable energy projects for which the BESS will be built. “We are also hoping to make India a supply base for our global needs. So, India could export to Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) nations and potentially, Europe. We are already doing projects in India,” he said.

Teichmann also stated that going by the current pace of projects, it might take India 3-4 years to actually start adding 5 GWh of battery storage annually to meet its goal of 50 GWh of domestic capacity by 2030. India plans to generate 50 percent of its electricity from non-fossil fuel sources by 2030. Further, it aims to achieve net zero by 2070.

India’s battery storage schemes will boost EVs

Nebreda said the push for electric vehicles (EV) in India will automatically make the country an attractive manufacturing location for energy storage systems. “That's one element. The second element is that the Indian government’s energy storage programme was also driven by the EV push. This will catalyse the production of batteries in India. Since gas is expensive and renewable energy is intermittent, energy storage systems are the natural solution,” he added.

As part of India’s EV Vision 2030, the government has targeted 30 percent electric vehicle (EV) penetration by 2030.

On May 12, 2021, the union government approved a production-linked incentive (PLI) scheme for the manufacture of advanced chemistry cell (ACC) battery storage. The total outlay of the scheme is Rs. 18,100 crore over a period of five years.

Also, in her budget speech on February 1, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman said that BESS projects will be offered viability gap funding (VGF) for a total capacity of 4,000 MWh.

First 150 MWh BESS of the JV to be ready by July-August

Teichmann informed that a 150 MWh BESS will be commissioned by July-August in Karnataka. “This will be the biggest at present. But bigger BESS’ from others are set to come up very soon. However, this is not our first project in India. Our first project was a 10 MWh system in Delhi in 2019.”

Next, he said, the company will set up a 50 MWh BESS by the end of this year. “But there will be more soon. We also have Fluence’s cloud-based asset performance management software, which we plan to apply on every system globally, including our projects in India,” he added.

Teichmann said the asset performance management software helps monitor the system up to the cell level of the batteries. “What is the temperature, what is the performance, what is the status of the system (in order to predict output)? It tells all that. It also predicts service needs in real time. It is a very detailed monitoring system, which helps improve system performance,” he explained.

He added that the company is also attracted to the commercial and industrial (C&I) market and is exploring corporate power purchase agreements (PPAs). “We are trying to figure out how big that market really is. It is an interesting segment,” Teichmann said.

Previous
Previous

News round-up, March 2, 2023

Next
Next

News round-up, Tuesday, February 28, 2023