The energy sector is currently grappling with a unique challenge referred to as the "unwelcome bid."
Germán & Co workart image.“Human life is so fleeting, and old age can be harsh on our brains. Some substances have been developed to slow cognitive decline, but we still can't escape the inevitability of our vital cycle.
Today, Time magazine published an article titled "Here's How Biden Can Bounce Back From the Disastrous Presidential Debate," while the New York Times suggests that the president, who holds veto power, may be retiring from his long political career. In the face of the complex and rapidly changing world we live in, this decision may be coming a bit too late…
Source: Juliet - Le Monde Diplomatique'Anti-access/area denial': the Mediterranean sees an increase in restricted areas as tensions escalate. Nations assert their dominance in the Mediterranean. Socrates likened the inhabitants of the Mediterranean to 'frogs around a pond'. However, the once peaceful coexistence is now under threat as countries assert their territorial claims…
The price of wind generation is bouncing back. / Image: Germán & Co“Finance ministries may initially rejoice at the prospect of short-term gains; however, such actions could ultimately result in a surge of long-term costs that burden society…
Germany and the Netherlands have recently allocated 6.5 GW of new offshore wind projects through auctions. While this may seem optimistic at first glance, a notable issue has arisen: negative bidding. This development has placed considerable pressure on offshore wind developers. The following overview provides an insight into the current situation.
Negative Bidding and Contract for Difference (CfD) Auctions:
In the context of negative bidding, developers of wind farms submit bids indicating the amount they are willing to pay for the opportunity to construct a wind farm. A higher bid increases their likelihood of success.
Meanwhile, the focus is on Contract for Difference (CfD) auctions in various European regions, such as the EU. In this process, developers compete by bidding on the revenue they anticipate requiring, with the winning bid being the one with the lowest value. Upon winning, their revenue becomes linked to the agreed-upon strike price. Negative bidding substantially increases the expenses associated with establishing an offshore wind farm. Ultimately, developers transfer these costs to either the supply chain or consumers, intensifying the urgency surrounding the situation.
Germany has allocated 2.5 GW, while the Netherlands has allocated 4 GW. SSE Renewables from the UK and Dutch pension funds are investing €40 million in developing a 2 GW site, whereas Vattenfall and Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners are investing €800 million in another 2 GW site. These expenses, resulting directly from negative bidding, impact the wind energy supply chain and consumers and raise significant long-term societal concerns. This situation provides a compelling rationale for immediate action.
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Workart by Germán & Co. creates functional and creative artistic pieces to enhance any space.Negative Bidding Continues to Burden Offshore Wind Development
WindInsider.com by S.R.C. Roy, June 27, 2024.Germany and the Netherlands have recently awarded 6.5 GW of new offshore wind projects. Germany awarded 2.5 GW and the Netherlands 4 GW. To put this in context the EU has 19 GW of offshore wind in operation.
The auctions in both countries used negative bidding, where wind farm developers bid the amount of money they’re ready to pay for the right to build a wind farm – and the higher the price you bid the more likely you are to win. Most other countries in Europe use Contract for Difference (CfD) auctions where developers bid the amount of revenue they think they need, and the lowest bid wins.
If you win a negative bidding auction your revenue will be whatever is the wholesale market price of electricity. If you win a CfD auction your revenue will be whatever you bid in the auction, and if the market prices are higher than the agreed strike price, you pay the difference to the Government.
The negative bidding amounts are a straight add-on to the costs of developing an offshore wind farm. It’s extra money the developer has to pay which they don’t pay in a CfD auction. Project developers have to pass on these costs. Either to the wind energy supply chain which is still recovering from supply disruptions and cost increases. And/or to electricity consumers in the form of higher electricity prices.
Auction results…
The results of the latest German auction were:
TotalEnergies will pay €1.958bn to develop the N-11.2 site which has a capacity of around 1.5 GW. So they’re paying €1.3m per MW.
EnBW will pay €1.065bn to develop the roughly 1 GW N12.3 site. That’s €1.1m per MW.
The results of the latest Dutch auction were:
UK-based SSE Renewables and the Dutch state pension fund APG and ABP will pay €40mn to develop the 2GW IJmuiden Ver Alpha site. That’s €20,000 per MW.
Vattenfall and Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners will pay €800mn to develop the 2GW IJmuiden Ver Beta site. That’s €400,000 per MW.
Germany and the Netherlands both used negative bidding in their previous offshore wind auctions already. The Netherlands previously applied a cap on the bids which equated to €70,000 per MW – their cap is higher now. Germany doesn’t apply a cap. The winners of their previous auction, BP and Total Energies, are paying €12.6bn for the right to develop 7 GW – which equates to €1.8m per MW.
Negative bidding also means higher financing costs than you get with wind farms that are awarded in a CfD auction. The latter have fixed revenue, so banks feel much more comfortable offering more debt finance. But projects awarded in a negative bidding auction have variable revenue – the market price of electricity. So they need to rely more on (more expensive) equity finance – though they can mitigate this by signing PPAs with offtakers.
“Negative bidding increases the costs of offshore wind. Costs that have to be passed on to consumers and the wind energy supply chain. It may be a short-term gain for finance ministries. But it’s a long-term cost for society”, says WindEurope CEO Giles Dickson.
Non-price criteria…
The Dutch auction made extensive use of non-price criteria. For the Alpha site these were about biodiversity protection. For the Beta site it was system integration. The winning bidders made significant commitments to invest in these respective areas. Vattenfall and CIP have among other things committed to build a 1 GW electrolyser facility in Rotterdam which will run on renewable electricity from the Beta site. And the Alpha wind farm is designed as a “living laboratory” – more than 75% of the wind turbines in the wind farm will have artificial reefs for muscles and other maritime animals.
“The Dutch auction shows the European wind industry has a great offering on ecology and system integration. “We are building new wind farms and creating lasting value for Europe’s environment and energy system”, says Giles Dickson.
The German auction used price criteria only.
What’s the money used for?
In Germany 90% of the money raised from negative bidding will be used to reduce the grid levies. The other 10% are used to support maritime biodiversity and sustainable fishing practices. OK. But building these wind farms requires a strengthening of Germany’s offshore wind supply chain and an expansion of port capacity. The German Government should consider putting some of the money into that as well.
Cécile Marin's workConflict and tension in the Mediterranean
by Philippe Leymarie and Cécile Marin's work in Le Monde Diplomatique covers a range of topics, including geopolitical conflicts, economic systems, and social issues, presented through detailed maps and analyses.The Mediterranean is less than 0.8% of the world’s ocean but a quarter of all global trade passes through it: it’s a vital short cut from the Atlantic (via the Strait of Gibraltar) to the Indian and Pacific oceans (via the Suez Canal and Red Sea) and the only way to reach the Black Sea (via the Bosphorus). And it’s crossed by submarine pipelines and cables that supply Europe with two thirds of its imported energy. Bordered by some 20 countries, it is in the words of French historian Fernand Braudel an ancient crossroads where ‘civilisations [are] superimposed one on top of the other’ (1). However, it’s also a site of tensions between countries to its north and south, and between Israelis and Palestinians, Shia and Sunni Muslims, Arabs and Africans.
Jean-Michel Martinet of the Mediterranean Foundation for Strategic Studies (FMES) describes the Mediterranean as a source of crises amid ‘unprecedented and chaotic multipolarity’ and as ‘both a bridge and a buffer between two worlds: the countries on its northern shores – rich, postmodern and with ageing populations – and those on its southern shores – which face economic, demographic, social and political problems’ (2).
‘Once a shared space, the Mediterranean is now contested,’ French parliamentarians Jean-Jacques Ferrara and Philippe Michel-Kleisbauer wrote in a February 2022 report to the National Assembly (3), listing sources of tension: power strategies and rivalries (Russia, the West, China); anti-access/area denial (4) (Russia, Syria, Turkey); frozen conflicts that have flared up again (Cyprus, Western Sahara); and the continuing effects of Libya’s civil war in the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger).
Since the report, there are new factors: the war in Ukraine, taking place partly by the Black Sea; a fifth war in Gaza; Armenia losing territory; worsening food and energy insecurity. As FMES director Xavier Pasco put it at last November’s Strategic Mediterranean Dialogue (RSMed) in Toulon, ‘Problems are multi-layered, [feedback] loops are growing tighter, and conflicts are accelerating to the point of hysteria.’
The Mediterranean is bristling with aircraft, radar systems, anti-missile batteries, ships, submarines and drones, all increasing the risk of human error…
Retired French vice-admiral Pascal Ausseur says the Ukraine war is also a sign that peaceful cohabitation in the Mediterranean is breaking down. Meanwhile, Pasco highlights growing resentment and even hatred of Europeans in Africa and the Middle East, where they are seen as ‘warmongers who apply double standards to refugees and are responsible for the coming famine’. He believes Europe is losing an information war and needs to ‘counter harmful Russian, Chinese and Turkish narratives’. That might be easier without the extensive use of force and violations of international law: by the US in former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan; China in the China Sea; Russia in Georgia and Ukraine; France and the UK in Libya; Azerbaijan in the Caucasus; and Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean.
Continuing disputes, growing conflicts
There are other risks too: the standoff between Greece and Turkey (Greece’s actions on some small islands (5) and seizure of Turkish gas exploration and drilling vessels; the long-running dispute over the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus); recent incidents between Israel and Iran (air strikes, skirmishes on land and at sea); Israel’s offensive against Hizbullah in Lebanon; possible destabilisation of the Egyptian and Tunisian governments; tensions between Morocco and Algeria over Western Sahara; the resumption of Libya’s civil war (a source of regional jihadism); sabotage and attacks on submarine cables and pipelines; use of migration as a political tool, as in Turkey; disputes over maritime boundaries.
Challenges to maritime boundaries are of special concern to countries on the northern shores of the Mediterranean, whose navies now find their movements restricted. The 1994 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sanctioned the establishment of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) extending 200 nautical miles from the coast – a concession to coastal countries of the global South in particular, which hoped to benefit from their resources (6). It also guaranteed right of passage through EEZs, and even the right of passage of naval vessels through territorial waters (12 nautical miles) provided it was for innocent purposes.
This balance is under threat. Some countries bordering the Mediterranean are attempting to maximise their maritime space and restrict the rights of other countries within it. They are gradually giving their EEZs a political as well as economic status by adopting military ‘anti-access/area denial’ measures, introducing permit and toll systems, building offshore wind farms and oil drilling platforms, and creating marine protected areas. Major seafaring nations that have not signed UNCLOS are now attached to the EEZ compromise and keen to uphold it as ‘the law of the sea becomes a means of asserting control’, according to a wide-ranging study on the ‘territorialisation of maritime space’ (7).
In the western Mediterranean, Algeria has unilaterally asserted an EEZ that takes no account of Italy’s claims to the waters around Sardinia or Spain’s around the Balearics, while in the eastern Mediterranean, historic tensions, ambitions of regional domination and economic interests make the issue of maritime boundaries all the more sensitive. Jean-François Pelliard, a consultant with the FMES, describes a ‘creeping territorialisation’. Under its Blue Homeland doctrine, proclaimed in 2019, Turkey (which has not signed UNCLOS) claims a maritime jurisdiction area of 462,000 sq km under the Lausanne treaty with Greece, which requires the Aegean Sea to be open to both countries.
Turkey secures favourable deals
Turkey is disregarding the claims of Greece and Cyprus, both UNCLOS signatories, and gas exploration activities under the protection of the Turkish navy have led to a number of incidents. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan frequently threatens to invade Greek islands close to Turkey where Greece has established a military presence and deployed defence systems during exercises such as Operation Lightning (January 2023).
Turkey, the only country to recognise Northern Cyprus, feels disadvantaged. In 2022, in exchange for providing military support to the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity in Libya, it secured a bilateral agreement on maritime boundaries that is more favourable to its own interests but still ignores Greek and Cypriot claims.
In the southeastern Mediterranean, where major natural gas deposits have been discovered in recent years, an unhoped-for agreement in 2022 between Israel and Lebanon (officially at war) has resulted in Israel maintaining control of the Karish maritime block, while most of the Qana block is assigned to Lebanon and its output will be exploited by a consortium including TotalEnergies, Eni and QatarEnergy; Turkey was excluded from this arrangement.
Immigration is another source of tension. Most irregular immigration to the European Union is via the Mediterranean route, with 266,940 migrants and refugees crossing in 2023 (8). Italy’s rightwing government has restricted NGOs’ ability to rescue migrants at sea by keeping their vessels in port on a variety of pretexts, making this already dangerous route (3,105 migrants drowned in 2023) even more deadly. The EU is trying to slow the influx in various ways. Under a 2016 deal Turkey agreed to keep three to four million (mostly Syrian) refugees on its territory in return for a payment of at least €6bn, but in 2020 it opened its border, allowing some 20,000 refugees to try to cross into Greece, in response to EU criticism of its offensive against the Kurds in northern Syria (9).
In the southern Mediterranean, the EU is supporting the Libyan coastguard and trying to relaunch a programme to combat human trafficking. However, in November 2023, the leaders of the military coup in Niger repealed a law criminalising migrant smuggling on the grounds that it was passed in 2015 ‘under the influence of foreign powers’ (10), and Tunisian president Kais Saied has said that his country ‘will not be Europe’s border guard’ (Reuters, 10 June 2023).
France has decided to paint out the pennant numbers and names of its largest warships. With ‘high-intensity’ engagements increasingly likely, it hopes this will make them harder to identify as they patrol the Mediterranean; the French navy’s position is that ‘uncertainty over a vessel’s identity can be a tactical advantage’ (11). Western military chiefs believe a tipping point has been reached: ‘Disorder is increasing and the world order is being circumvented: we must be ready for the situation to deteriorate very rapidly,’ says Admiral Nicolas Vaujour, head of the French navy, pointing to an unprecedented deployment of naval forces in the Mediterranean. Hence his decision to step up training, which now includes broader missions conducted close to crisis hotspots (as there is almost daily contact with the Russian navy, these must ‘take care to avoid misunderstandings and errors’); and exercises to strengthen interoperability among allied navies ‘to the point where they become interchangeable’, as the head of the Italian navy (also busy strengthening its forces) puts it.
‘Militarise to assert sovereignty’
Countries all around the Mediterranean are strengthening their navies. Between 2008 and 2030, Israel plans to increase its warship tonnage by 160%, Egypt by 170%, Algeria by 120%, Morocco by 52% and Turkey by 33%. A strong navy symbolises strength and influence, as well as protecting a country’s interests and enforcing its claims. ‘You militarise to assert sovereignty,’ says Nicolas Mazzucchi of the French Navy Centre for Strategic Studies (CESM). So North African countries are investing in first-rate vessels such as frigates. Algeria, as a strategic partner of Russia, has armed its submarines with Russian Kalibr long-range cruise missiles; it also sources equipment from China. Its defence allocation – 13.8% of GDP in 2023 – is proportionally the world’s largest, mainly to send a message to neighbouring Morocco.
The Mediterranean is bristling with aircraft, radar systems, anti-missile batteries, ships, submarines and drones, all increasing the risk of human error. There is a growing potential for miscalculations, misinterpretations of data or provocations that can rapidly escalate, though such incidents are usually settled ‘in a professional manner’. Anti-access/area denial measures keep foreign navies in check, as they are always within range of missiles fired from land or sea. Attacks by Yemen’s Houthi rebels on shipping in the Red Sea show that modern drones and missiles make it possible to ‘fight a naval battle without a navy’, as Ausseur puts it.
With Washington’s pivot to the Indo-Pacific in recent decades, the US Navy had reduced its strength in the Mediterranean and the role of NATO to some extent: French rear-admiral Jean-Emmanuel Roux de Luze, former naval attaché in Washington, recalls that in 2020 the Pentagon’s three top priorities were ‘China, China and China’. Nevertheless, the US still had a significant presence in the Mediterranean and the Gulf, with some 30 military bases, several fleets and considerable anti-missile capabilities. It continued to keep an eye on Israel, its protégé, on Iran, its principal adversary in the region, and on the shipping lanes used by giant container carriers heading to Europe. Since Russia invaded Ukraine, and especially since the start of the war in Gaza, the aircraft carriers have returned.
US support for Ukraine has increased the strategic importance of the eastern Mediterranean, dominated in recent years by Turkey, Russia and their allies. Washington has resumed its leadership of a reinvigorated NATO, which has a network of bases in the area: NATO’s naval headquarters is in Naples; US Navy frigates armed with Aegis missile defence systems are based in Rota, Spain; AWACS early warning and control aircraft operated by the US Air Force or directly by NATO fly from Sicily and Greece, which enables them to come close to Ukraine; NATO’s land forces are coordinated from Izmir, in Turkey. Though the Mediterranean is no longer a ‘NATO lake’, as it was during the cold war, it remains a useful location from which to monitor the major areas of friction between the Eurasian, Middle Eastern and African blocs.
Russia secures warm-water ports
The first country to fill the space left by the US in recent years was Russia, always in search of warm-water ports. Because of the war in Syria, it has been able to strengthen its presence in the eastern Mediterranean by securing the use of the Tartus (naval) and Khmeimim (air) bases, on the Syrian coast. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 seemed to have guaranteed its control of the naval base at Sebastopol on the Black Sea, and it had been turning the Azov Sea into an ‘internal lake’, but the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 changed everything. In two years, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has lost 20 ships and its movements are hindered by the fact that the 1936 Montreux Convention bans military vessels involved in a regional conflict from passing through the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles.
Russia has had to bolster its forces in the eastern Mediterranean with ships from its Baltic and Pacific fleets, and is struggling with long supply chains and the difficulty of maintaining often ageing equipment. Its network of bases and installations is insufficient for its geopolitical ambitions. Nevertheless, from their bases in Syria, the Russian navy and air force are able to restrict the freedom of maritime and aerial navigation in the eastern Mediterranean that the Western powers once enjoyed to a few tens of kilometres.
In recent years, China too has become involved in the Mediterranean. Increasingly seen as a ‘strategic competitor’ all over the world, its main concern is trade access: more than two thirds of its exports to Europe transit the Suez Canal
As a major regional player, Turkey’s strength lies in its strategic power (it controls access to the Black Sea), energy (it’s a hub in the supply of natural gas to Europe), geopolitics (it’s the only Asian member of NATO, whose southern flank it protects) and demographics (it has the Mediterranean area’s second-largest population (after Egypt) and has taken in millions of refugees, notably from Syria. While happy to harness anti-Western sentiment for domestic political ends, and refusing to apply international sanctions against Russia, Turkey feels free to do as it pleases because the US, EU and Russia all need it.
Turkey’s position in NATO has been strengthened by its role as mediator in the July 2022 agreement between Russia and Ukraine on the export of Ukrainian cereals by sea. It manufactures three quarters of its own weaponry, exports Bayraktar TB2 drones to some 15 countries including Ukraine, and has been able to buy the latest Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile systems (despite US opposition). The US, which removed Turkey from a list of potential buyers for F-35 fighter jets in response, is said to be reconsidering its position as a way of thanking Erdoğan for dropping his opposition to Sweden joining NATO.
Though not a Mediterranean country, Iran also plays an important role in the area because of its influence over Shia militias in Iraq, Hizbullah in Lebanon and Syria, and Houthi rebels in Yemen; and because of its involvement in the region’s Kurdish problem. Israel and Iran’s airstrikes on each other since 7 October have increased regional tensions.
Enter China, ‘strategic competitor’
In recent years, China too has become involved in the Mediterranean. Increasingly seen as a ‘strategic competitor’ all over the world, its main concern is trade access; more than two thirds of its exports to Europe transit the Suez Canal. As part of its part of its Belt and Road Initiative, it already has the use of a dozen interconnected port facilities around the Mediterranean, thanks to capital stakes held by the state-owned China Cosco Shipping Corporation Limited (COSCO Shipping) in Egypt (Port Said, Damietta), France (Marseille-Fos), Turkey (Ambarlı), Greece (Piraeus), Italy (Vado Ligure) and Spain (Valencia), soon to be joined by Algeria (El Hamdania), where China overtook France as largest trading partner in 2012.
China is also making its mark in the sizeable market for submarine cables across the Mediterranean. It has invested heavily in the western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia), anticipating their accession to the EU. The Chinese navy has had a base in Djibouti at the mouth of the Red Sea (the only one outside China) for the last five years, and is thought to be capable of deploying an entire fleet in the Mediterranean if needed. ‘The question is not if, but when,’ Vice-Admiral Hervé Bléjean, director-general of the EU’s military staff said in November 2022.
Over the next few decades, knowledge and mapping of the Mediterranean will advance considerably. Artificial intelligence, satellite networks and drones are likely to make exploiting its seabed resources profitable (12); for some European countries, access to the Gulf and its hydrocarbons will no longer be essential; global warming will open up Russia’s Northern Sea Route; the tipping of the strategic balance towards Asia will further focus the US’s attention on the Pacific and China, now the world’s largest naval power; dwindling fish stocks will cause tensions to grow; autonomous surveillance and detection systems coupled with laser weapons and batteries of hypersonic missiles will ensure security over large expanses of sea – and deny access to them…
In the short term (five to ten years), the FMES warns of a possible resumption of hostilities between Algeria and Morocco, with an incident in Western Sahara triggering a cascade of responses: Algeria declaring a naval embargo on Morocco, the EU supporting Morocco, and France’s already difficult relations with Algeria degenerating still further, with Algeria threatening to turn off the supply of gas (via Morocco) to Europe, imposing an anti-access/area denial zone using its Russian S-400 batteries or even Iskander cruise missiles, and halting traffic through the Gibraltar strait.
The FMES’s long-term scenario (20 years+) could include wars over maritime resources (fish stocks and seabed minerals); a gradual but complete appropriation of ‘economic zones’ by non-European countries – ‘an example of the de-Westernisation of international law’ – with restrictions imposed on navigation in the southern and eastern Mediterranean and the Black and Red seas; or even the formation of an anti-Western alliance in the eastern Mediterranean that would prevent warships from reaching the Indian and Pacific oceans via the Suez Canal, forcing them to sail around the Cape of Good Hope and requiring a rethink of networks of overseas bases.
The article "TIME" is authored by Jeffrey Sonnenfeld and Steven Tian, published on June 29, 2024, at 1:14 PM EDT. Sonnenfeld holds the position of Lester Crown Professor of Management Practice at Yale, presides as the President of the Yale Chief Executive Leadership Institute, and is noted for his works "The Hero’s Farewell" and "Firing Back." Steven Tian serves as the research director at the same institute.Coming off what was widely regarded as a disastrous debate performance, President Joe Biden, 81, faces a growing chorus of calls for him to step aside. Biden typically recoils from any criticism related to his age, but the urgent crisis he faces has become too pressing for him to ignore. However, all is not lost yet for Biden. The path forward is not easy, but there is still time for him to clear the air, with convincing explanations building off his track record of turning failures into demonstrated resilience.
Here are the three possible pathways for how Biden can move forward from his catastrophic debate performance and salvage his standing.
Biden could operate as though it’s business as usual
Unfortunately, this seems to have become the default option for many leading Democratic apparatchiks ranging from Gavin Newsom and John Fetterman to Kamala Harris. It was sad to see credible people taking an incredible position and backing Biden directly after that debate on Thursday. Newsom ludicrously claimed, “I am very proud of the President,” while Fetterman ripped Biden critics as “vultures” and advised them to “chill the f-ck out.”
Many Democrats likely fear incurring the wrath of Biden, who is notoriously prickly about his age. And sure, these Biden supporters can point out that the debate was only one night and that Biden’s three-and-a-half years of accomplishments should matter more—but the American people cannot and will not simply write off such a historically bad debate performance.
The Trumpian denial of reality among these “business as usual” types leans towards political malpractice. In defaulting to what they view as the safest answers, these Dems are actually doing a massive disservice to their own cause and risk destroying their own credibility.
Biden could head out on the road and prove his fitness to govern in front of voters across America
Instead of avoiding the issue, or hiding behind layers of overly protective staff in the White House, Biden can tackle it head-on with a proactive, forceful demonstration of his own fitness to govern. While speculation swirls about whether Biden should step down, there is no better way for Biden to silence the critics than to show beyond a shadow of doubt that he remains on top of his game and that the debate catastrophe was a one-time aberration, not the norm. But time is of the essence here.
Painful as it may be, Biden should own up to a poor debate and candidly admit why that was. Putting aside his age, what caused this? Was he having a bad reaction to cold medication? Did an overanxious debate prep team overcoach him? Was he overwhelmed with obscure facts and figures instead of being encouraged to be himself?
Already, Biden appears to be confronting matters head-on. At a rally in North Carolina on Friday, Biden addressed his poor debate performance as well as the issue of his age with more self-awareness than ever before.
“I know I’m not a young man, to state the obvious… I know. Folks, I know I don’t walk as easy as I used to. I don’t speak as smoothly as I used to. I don’t debate as well as I used to. But I know what I do know,” the President said to a cheering crowd. “I know how to tell the truth. I know right from wrong. I know how to do this job. I know how to get things done. I know that when you get knocked down, you get back up.”
But to restore his credibility in the eyes of the public, Biden has to do not just staged pep rallies with friendly reverential audiences, but engage urgently in genuine unscripted, responsive exchanges with independent media and outside key opinion leaders.
Biden sat down with TIME for a cover story published in early June, but it’s rare to get such direct access to this particular President. It’s long been a topic of discussion how Biden gives less media interviews than his predecessors. This isolation has never served Biden well; but now, it is especially vital that he reach out to key donors, political allies, and other influencers across civil society to re-establish his standing and to re-engage journalists.
Biden has every opportunity now to fortify his credibility in the eyes of the American public, and there should be no premature rush to judgment—a point made by varied voices ranging from former Obama campaign manager David Plouffe to lifelong Republican Mark Cuban. Already, key Democratic Party heavyweights such as former Presidents Barack Obama and Bill Clinton have come out with statements of support meant to help tide Biden over for the time being—but the ultimate judge will be the American people. And there are signs the people will be far less judgmental than the media commentator class, with Biden surprisingly up 1% after the debate.
Biden could make the change many are calling for
The Biden many Americans saw during the debate is not the Biden I [Sonnenfeld] have known for five decades. In fact, I spoke briefly with the President last month at a Greenwich fundraiser, and I had no inkling that anything was off in the slightest. Having known Biden for so long, and having admired his great presidency, it pains me to say this but after the debate disaster, the onus is on Biden now to prove his fitness to govern in the eyes of the public. If he fails at this, he should step aside before the choice is made for him by the American people at the ballot box in November, as many prominent voices ranging from the New York Times Editorial Board to AMC Theatres CEO Adam Aron have called for.
Despite the anxious clamoring of top donors, operatives and others, the path to replacing Biden on the ballot is fraught with difficulties. First, and most obviously, there is no evidence Biden is eager to step aside, no matter what anyone else says about him.
For Biden to even remotely consider stepping down voluntarily, it could very well fall to such senior party leaders as the Clintons, Obama, Speaker Emerita Nancy Pelosi, Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, Rep. Jim Clyburn, and House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries to try to convince him. And even then, it seems highly unlikely.
Even if Biden did voluntarily step aside, and release his pledged delegates for an open convention; the nomination process in such a rushed contest may prove to be so divisive that the party could be worse off. It’s also worth pointing out there is no clear frontrunner, with Vice President Kamala Harris trailing Trump in polls far worse than Biden.
While rising stars such as Jeffries or Governor of Michigan Gretchen Whitmer look like appealing choices, and could be a unifying dream team, they come with their own drawbacks too, and it would be unprecedented for a novice presidential candidate to build out a fully-fledged campaign infrastructure this late in the game. But these obstacles may prove to be the lesser-of-evils choice if Biden cannot prove once and for all that he is still fit to be President.
Biden should be given every opportunity now to rebound from the debate and show he is fit to govern. Should he fail to do so, only then will it be time for him to step aside.
On 6 October 1981, Anwar Sadat, the 3rd President of Egypt, was assassinated during the annual victory parade held in Cairo to celebrate Operation Badr, during which the Egyptian Army had crossed the Suez Canal and taken back the Sinai Peninsula from Israel at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War.[1] The assassination was undertaken by members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Although the motive has been debated, Sadat's assassination likely stemmed from Arab nationalists who opposed Sadat's peace initiative with Israel and the United States relating to the Camp David Accords.The Common Good…
Initially published by Stanford University on Monday, February 26, 2018.In ordinary political discourse, the “common good” refers to those facilities—whether material, cultural or institutional—that the members of a community provide to all members in order to fulfill a relational obligation they all have to care for certain interests that they have in common. Some canonical examples of the common good in a modern liberal democracy include: the road system; public parks; police protection and public safety; courts and the judicial system; public schools; museums and cultural institutions; public transportation; civil liberties, such as the freedom of speech and the freedom of association; the system of property; clean air and clean water; and national defense. The term itself may refer either to the interests that members have in common or to the facilities that serve common interests. For example, people may say, “the new public library will serve the common good” or “the public library is part of the common good”.
As a philosophical concept, the common good is best understood as part of an encompassing model for practical reasoning among the members of a political community. The model takes for granted that citizens stand in a “political” or “civic” relationship with one another and that this relationship requires them to create and maintain certain facilities on the grounds that these facilities serve certain common interests. The relevant facilities and interests together constitute the common good and serve as a shared standpoint for political deliberation.[1] When citizens face various questions about legislation, public policy or social responsibility, they resolve these questions by appeal to a conception of the relevant facilities and the relevant interests. That is, they argue about what facilities have a special claim on their attention, how they should expand, contract or maintain existing facilities, and what facilities they should design and build in the future.
The common good is an important concept in political philosophy because it plays a central role in philosophical reflection about the public and private dimensions of social life. Let’s say that “public life” in a political community consists of a shared effort among members to maintain certain facilities for the sake of common interests. “Private life” consists of each member’s pursuit of a distinct set of personal projects. As members of a political community, we are each involved in our community’s public life and in our own private lives, and this raises an array of questions about the nature and scope of each of these enterprises. For example, when are we supposed to make decisions based on the common good? Most of us would agree that we are required to do so when we act as legislators or civil servants. But what about as journalists, corporate executives or consumers? More fundamentally, why should we care about the common good? What would be wrong with a community whose members withdraw from public life and focus exclusively on their own private lives? These are some of the questions that motivate philosophical discussions of the common good.
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