* Manual of Ethics"

John Stuart Mackenzie (1860–1935), a British philosopher born near Glasgow, was educated at esteemed institutions such as the University of Glasgow, Cambridge, and Berlin.  His 1929 work, "A Manual of Ethics", was a seminal contribution to the field.  In this work, Mackenzie explored how the pursuit and accumulation of wealth and power in private, political, or religious spheres can undermine moral principles and values.  His groundbreaking ideas have since become a cornerstone of modern ethical discourse.  They have influenced our understanding of ethics, particularly in the areas of social justice, individual responsibility, and the role of power in shaping moral norms.  This definition of ethics, characterised by a "fragmented world with a delicate glass ceiling", remains relevant today. 

An anecdotal coincidence related to the publication of this essay was that 1929 was the year of organising the International Exposition of Barcelona.  Suppose we consider this in relation to Spain's present-day fight to uphold democracy.  Additionally, the second shoe belongs to the Mackenzie family, who immigrated to Argentina with Milei after enduring a harsh journey like the dramatic narrative of Edmondo De Amicis: "From the Apennines to the Andes".  This narrative, while not directly related to Mackenzie's work, can be seen as a reflection of the ethical dilemmas and challenges individuals and families face in the pursuit of a better life.  Mackenzie's father passed away upon their arrival in Argentina, leading to the return of the two brothers to England.  This event, in the context of Mackenzie's ideas, raises questions about the role of personal ethics in making life-altering decisions.  It may be interesting for both presidents (Sánchez-Milei) and us to consider this significant aspect of ethics. In simpler terms, we must let go of our archetypes. The powerful combination of egoism, avarice, and fear triggers war.  

Four minor historical details help us comprehend the chaotic world in which we live.

This edition focuses on ethics, and we dedicate our time and effort, even on weekends and weekdays, until religious obligations prevent us from working to provide you with an unbiased analysis.

Your support has been overwhelming and is deeply appreciated. I must acknowledge that being a blogger is not easy.  The impact of our content on platform 'X' last week, with one of our posts reaching nearly 3 million people within a day, receiving around a thousand likes, and being shared nine hundred times (https://x.com/Germantoroghio/status/1790282837196783887), has been truly motivating. Our score of 200K on Energy Central, placing us among the top ten influencers, and the invitations from LinkedIn experts for collaborative essays are all thanks to you. We are grateful for your role in our success.

The article addresses the difficulties of existing in a world affected by war and inflation, seemingly without an escape. To better understand these issues, we have chosen five essays that may shed light on the current predicament: “The war of religion in the 21st century…Germany and Russia’s volatile relationship in the 20th century…Comparing China’s Engagement in Africa and Latin America…The Failures of America’s Foreign Policy…Today's big surprise: Zelensky accuses China of helping Russia sabotage peace summit…”

In a challenging world, the role of humor and everyday life is deemed essential for survival. The human dynamics surrounding the Lewinsky/Clinton and Stormy Daniels/Trump situations are examined from the standpoint of emotional and mundane considerations.  This concise text examines the differing reactions of Presidents Clinton and Trump to their respective situations. President Clinton affably admitted his participation, declaring, "I cherished the time in a romantic way, without physical intimacy," The show emphasized the significance of non-physical contact and then came to a conclusion.  Conversely, President Trump has denied any contact with the Playboy model, which has had negative consequences for the former president in the trial in New York; however, the final word is still pending.  It is remarkable that former President Trump's campaign and the GOP raised $52.8 million following his conviction.

Wishing myself a good night and a very good morning to my dear friends...

KARLSTAD - JUNE 3, 2024

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"At AES, we put a premium on conducting business with the highest standards of integrity," said Paul Freedman, AES General Counsel. "AES has always been a values-driven company, and our people share a common purpose of working to improve lives and accelerating a greener, smarter energy future."

"Ethics matter. Organizations that commit to business integrity through robust programs and practices not only elevate standards and expectations for all, but also have better long-term performance," said Ethisphere CEO, Erica Salmon Byrne. "We continue to be inspired by the World's Most Ethical Companies honorees and their dedication to making real impact for their stakeholders and displaying exemplary values-based leadership. Congratulations to AES for earning a place in the World's Most Ethical Companies community."

In 2023, 135 honorees were recognized spanning 19 countries and 48 industries. 

The World's Most Ethical Companies announcement follows other recent honors recognizing AES' leading business practices, including being named one of the World's Most Innovative Companies by Fast Company; one of the 100 Just Companies in the US by JUST Capital; one of the Top 250 Best Managed Companies by the Wall Street Journal and The Drucker Institute; and as one of America's Most Responsible Companies by Newsweek.

The war of religion in the 21st century…

 Russia's war on Ukraine: The religious dimension

By European Parliamentary Research Service Author: Fearghas O'Beara, Members' Research Service PE 729.355 – April 2022

“The collapse of the Soviet Union (USSR), which had ruthlessly oppressed religion, led to a significant increase in church membership, religious belief, and practice in many of the successor states”.

“Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 drew attention to the close relationship between Vladimir Putin's regime and the Russian Orthodox Church. The latter has strongly backed Putin's war and has long provided theological and ideological justifications for his domestic and international actions. The Church's overtly political approach has contributed to deep divisions within the wider Orthodox world, including a formal split with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and significant tensions with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.”

The role of religion in Putin's regime…

A recent Pew Forum survey found that 71 % of Russians identified as Orthodox, along with 78 % of Ukrainians, 73 % of Belarusians and 92 % of Moldovans. A newly confident Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) viewed itself as a repository of Russian national identity, and Moscow as the 'third Rome' with primacy over the Orthodox Churches in those countries and beyond. At home, Putin has passed laws targeting 'non-traditional' religious minorities with fines, detention and criminal charges.

The ROC quickly aligned itself with the Putin regime, a process accelerated since the election of Kirill as 'Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia' in 2009. Claiming canonical jurisdiction over much of the former USSR territory, the current 'Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church' permanent membership includes, inter alia, metropolitans(bishops) of 'All Ukraine', 'All Belarus', 'All Moldova', Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The key doctrine elaborated by the Church, in tandem with the regime, over the past decades is the Russkiy Mir or 'Russian world', (however 'mir' also translates as peace). This ideology envisages a quasi-messianic role for Russia in saving Christian civilisation from the decadent West through the spreading of Russian language, culture and values, by re-dominating countries formerly within the USSR, and exerting influence throughout the wider Orthodox and Western world. In 2007, Putin established the Russkiy Mir Foundation, which de facto spreads this ideology around the world, working in close cooperation with the ROC.

On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians…

Thus, various experts have suggested that Russia's war on Ukraine has a religious dimension, and that Putin's desire to conquer Kyiv is part of a 'spiritual quest'. Putin himself laid out his Greater Russia vision in a long article in July 2021, entitled *'On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians'. In it, he claims that Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians are the same people whose 'common baptismal font' is Kyiv with the conversion to Christianity of Prince Volodymir (Vladimir in Russian) in 988. The narrative makes clear that Russia's enemies are located to the west. These, especially at the end of the 16th century, were 'Polonising and Latinising' Russian lands and 'ousting Orthodoxy'. Putin compares the creation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to those past events, clearly omitting the Ukrainian perspective. For Putin, Ukrainian identity or statehood have 'no historical basis' and are a geo-political tool to weaken Russia. The current Ukrainian leadership are characterised as 'radicals and neo-Nazis', and Putin leaves no doubt that his intention is to create 'a single large nation, a triune nation'.

Division within eastern Orthodox Christianity Long before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the close alignment between the ROC and the Putin regime had contributed to splits within Orthodoxy. The ROC suspended its own membership of the Conference of European Churches in 2008. Ever since Ukrainian independence in 1991, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had been seeking autonomy, culminating in the recognition of its independent status by the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew I in 2019, a goal on which former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko was personally engaged. Already, in 2016, when the Ecumenical Patriarch attempted to hold the first global Council of the Orthodox Church in Crete, it was boycotted by the ROC, but also by the Bulgarian and Georgian Orthodox Churches, both under strong Moscow influence.

The invasion has accelerated these divisions. Within Ukraine, a significant part of the church had remained faithful to Moscow, as a filial entitled the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Nevertheless, its leader, Metropolitan Onufriy, has appealed to Putin for an 'immediate end to the fratricidal war', referring unambiguously to Russia's 'military action against Ukraine'. Russia's war has also been condemned by the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, as well as leaders of the Orthodox Churches of Romania, Greece, and even Georgia, which had aligned itself with Moscow in the past. Another initiative was taken by a group of Orthodox theologians, who issued a 'Declaration on the Russian World (Russkii Mir) Teaching', condemning the 'fundamentalist, totalitarian' character of the doctrine promoted by the ROC under Kirill, which had ultimately led to 'Putin's unconscionable and horrendously destructive invasion of Ukraine'.

Divisions have also emerged within Russia itself; on 2 March a group of 233 ROC priests launched an appeal for peace, urging Russian soldiers be brought home, and stating that Ukrainians should be allowed to decide their own destiny. 

Peace initiatives of religious actors…

While Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been described by some as a 21st century 'religious war', the EU has increasingly engaged with religious actors in pursuing its foreign policy goals, including tapping into their potential for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. In the current context of a split within Orthodoxy, some quiet religious diplomacy by Western Christian church leaders has taken place. Notably, Russian Patriarch Kirill took part in two distinct on-line meetings on 16 March, with the Archbishop of Canterbury, head of the worldwide Anglican Church, and with Pope Francis, head of the Roman Catholic Church.

The Pope's Nuncio (ambassador) to Ukraine – a Lithuanian archbishop who previously served at the nunciature in Moscow – has remained in place in Kyiv and continues to liaise with Ukrainian political and church authorities. On 8 March he received a letter from the Mayor of Kyiv, Vitaliy Klitschko, inviting Pope Francis to visit the city, as a means of 'paving the path to peace in our city, country and beyond'. While the Pope has not ruled out such a visit, given the view of Patriarch Kirill that Ukraine is part of his 'canonical territory', it could be counter-productive. Francis and Kirill have only met once, in Havana in 2016, so an alternative démarche could be a meeting on 'neutral ground'. Vatican insiders have speculated that one possibility would be Jerusalem, as Francis could stop off on his forthcoming visit to Lebanon, which he announced on 21 March.

In parallel to contacts at the highest level, there have been exchanges between the Russian Orthodox and Catholic Churches at the level of their respective international and EU affairs arms. The Commission of Catholic Bishops' Conferences of the EU (COMECE) called upon Patriarch Kirill to 'appeal to Russian authorities to immediately stop the hostilities against the Ukrainian people', stressing his influence among Russian people. However, in his reply, Metropolitan Hilarion, Chair of the ROC's Department for External Church Relations, posited the war as a crisis 'between the West and Russia', referred to the 'long-suffering land of Ukraine' and reiterated their view that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is part of the Moscow Patriarchate. All these positions align closely with the official narrative of the Kremlin. Hilarion also suggested that COMECE should work with the EU 'in order to prevent further escalation', an indication of where the ROC considers fault for the war lies.

Meanwhile, the World Council of Churches (WCC), of which the Russian Orthodox Church has been a member since 1961, wrote to Kirill on 2 March asking for his mediation 'so that the war can be stopped'. The (Romanian Orthodox) Acting General-Secretary of the WCC called on the Patriarch of Moscow to 'raise up your voice on behalf of the suffering brothers and sisters, most of whom are also faithful members of our Orthodox Church'. In his response on 10 March, Kirill again used Kremlin rhetoric, viewing the war as a confrontation 'between the West and Russia', stating that Western 'political forces' had conspired to use Ukraine to 'make brotherly people’s enemies', and that all Western efforts to integrate Ukraine were founded upon a 'geopolitical strategy aimed at weakening Russia'.

The reply also laid the blame on the Ecumenical Patriarch for the schism in Orthodoxy, by recognising an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 2019. This could limit the scope of Bartholomew to mediate towards a peaceful solution, a potential role suggested by European Commission Vice-President Margaritis Schinas following his exchange with the Ecumenical Patriarch on 19 March.

*https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-plan-for-a-new-russian-empire-includes-both-ukraine-and-belarus/

Germany and Russia’s volatile relationship in the 20th century

Germany and the Russian invasion of Ukraine…

Written by Takeshitaka Kiwasaki, professor at the Sophia University of Japan, on November 23, 2023. 

When Russia invaded Ukraine, the recently-elected German Chancellor Olaf Scholz faced a dilemma, one shaped by the historical relationship between Germany and Russia. In February 2022, the Russian army invaded Ukraine. NATO member states were unanimous in condemning Russia and immediately imposed economic sanctions.  

However, Germany, the de facto leader of the EU, was so passive in its approach that the U.S. criticized it for being “out of step” with its allies. Why was this? Many countries around the world are either outright in their support of Russia or have officially declared neutrality but, in practice, are helping Russia by not participating in economic sanctions. For the Japanese, such a stance may appear inexplicable. 

But to understand why such a stance is rational for these countries—or, more accurately, for their incumbent governments—we must investigate the current state of their politics, economies, and diplomacy and their histories. We can illuminate their trains of thought by taking a multifaceted and broad view of these countries’ relations with Russia, their economies, and their cultures. 

The tumultuous relationship between Germany and Russia in the 20th century

The history of German-Russian relations is a seesaw of discord and compromise: the two countries were unable to trust each other, but they were also unable to sever ties. Even today, many Germans would prefer to leave a path open for Russia to reconcile with Europe—despite its transgressions—rather than see Russia become a client state of China. In this respect, Germany is at odds with the U.S., which has publicly stated its intention to critically weaken Russia—a country it views as an adversary. 

During the Second World War, Nazi Germany unilaterally ripped up the non-aggression pact it had signed with the Soviet Union (present-day Russia), invaded its erstwhile fellow signatory, and, for a while, occupied Ukraine and another Soviet territory. However, the Soviets ultimately won the war. Germany was divided, and East Germany fell under the influence of the U.S.S.R. 

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany in 1990 resulted in the independence of Russia and Ukraine. Since then, Germany has adopted a liberal form of diplomacy toward Russia, believing that deepening economic cooperation would help discourage political confrontations and disputes. Germany relies on Russia for much of its natural gas supply.

Indeed, former Chancellor Angela Merkel devoted great energy to building the Nord Stream, an undersea pipeline that enabled Germany to bypass politically unstable Ukraine when importing natural gas from Russia. Yet Merkel also supported the Westernization of Ukraine and actively worked to remedy the situation after Russia had annexed Crimea. 

Germany has struggled to balance humanitarian needs with a desire not to antagonize Russia. The role of area studies in building peace A relationship of trust that Germany thought it had built with President Vladimir Putin collapsed following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Chancellor Scholz faced a dilemma: safeguard the economic interests of the German public or succumb to the international community’s demands for cooperation, particularly on humanitarian issues. 

This dilemma is crucial in understanding why Germany was so lukewarm in its condemnation of Russia following the country’s invasion of Ukraine. In retaliation for the sanctions imposed upon Russia, President Putin has suspended natural gas exports, while the economic community has all but given up on Russia; for these reasons, Chancellor Scholz is gradually being compelled to side with the U.S. Although public opinion has—perhaps inevitably—hardened against the Putin administration, German society remains divided. 

The Scholz administration is trying to identify the most appropriate response. Bilateral relations do not reverse overnight; they are intimately linked to the two countries’ histories, cultures, economies, and national traits. We must strengthen mutual understanding by learning from each other’s experiences and sharing knowledge to build peace.

A Secret But Not a Secret...

Finally, some, despite all the warnings of the United States and other European countries, on September 26, 2022, by causing significant damage to three pipes belonging to the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines, tried to erase all the links between Russia and Germany, politically naive and practically impossible. According to Spiegel International on August 26, 2023 (read the full article on www.germantoroghio.com/blog-1-2/wltpflwya644ltd-9xgre-f9l3k-74tkd-tn6zx-w7shk-fbxaj-6sytt-9lekr-dk72t-krxf3-tm445-b7hj8-p962c-5z4l3-nntza-dywdz-xhf24-dxjl5-h6lly-jx95h-dalp4-6zlrk-fmre6-7zbng), the explosion of the Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea indicates that Kyiv-supposedly-may be responsible. The revelation may alarm the international community and prompt adjustments in world politics that would ultimately benefit Germany. Investigators have spent the last year tirelessly searching for the truth behind the explosion. The blast was a significant event that unfolded and shook the foundations of Germany's energy sector with profound implications across Europe's economy.

The European energy crisis and the consequences for the global natural gas market

The Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) by Simone Emiliozzi, Fabrizio Ferriani and Andrea Gazzani, 11 January 2024

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine severely disrupted European gas markets. Energy costs rose steeply, global natural gas flows were significantly reoriented, and policymakers’ focus shifted towards energy security. This column examines how the conflict has reshaped the natural gas market, with an emphasis on the role of liquefied natural gas. Europe has become a major importer of liquefied natural gas, crowding out imports to Latin America and Asia. Its gas market is becoming more integrated and global. Nonetheless, the outlook for the natural gas market remains subject to high uncertainty.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine constituted a significant breach of the global geopolitical order and of national sovereignty, with profound economic consequences that extend well beyond the direct effect of the war. These include, among others, a marked deterioration of the world macroeconomic outlook (Garicano et al. 2022, Albrizio et al. 2022, Alessandri and Gazzani 2023), disruptions in trade (World Bank 2022), and strong shockwaves across financial and commodity markets (Ferriani and Gazzani 2022, Boungou and Yatié 2022).

In a recent study (Emiliozzi et al. 2023), we focus on the impact of the war on energy commodity markets, and in particular on the reshaping of global energy flows, with a specific emphasis on the changes in the natural gas market. Up until 2021, Russia was the primary European provider of both natural gas and crude oil imports, accounting for 44% and 28% of the total extra-EU imports, respectively. Since the autumn of 2021, Russia’s weaponisation of its natural gas exports in response to the standoff on the Nord-Stream II pipeline approval contributed to a steady increase in natural gas prices. This trend deteriorated after the start of the conflict, with piped gas from Russia progressively diminishing throughout 2022 and causing widespread disruptions in energy markets. The conflict affected Europe first and foremost, although it produced global reverberations and sparked a worldwide reconfiguration of energy commodity flows for both natural gas and oil (Babina et al. 2023).

In this context, liquefied natural gas (LNG) emerged as a significant new player in the natural gas market, providing a critical contribution to ensure Europe’s energy security. LNG replaced a substantial portion of Russian pipeline exports to Europe, fundamentally changing the structure of the European gas market from regional and segmented into one that is more integrated and global.

Global reshuffle in LNG flows

Historically, European countries mainly relied on piped gas to satisfy their gas consumption needs and absorbed excess supply at convenient prices from the global LNG market, whose main traditional importers had been Asian countries (China, Japan, South Korea). Since mid-2021, Europe had to draw significant amounts from the LNG market to compensate the foregone Russian imports and started to act as a major LNG importer worldwide (Figure 1). In 2022 European LNG imports surged by almost 60% on a yearly basis and, notably, the share of LNG over total European supply soared to 53% from an average of 20% between 2000 and 2019.

Figure 1 LNG imports by world region and major importer nation

To bolster this upward trend, European countries made substantial investments to expand their regasification infrastructure so they may further exploit the potential of the LNG market in the future. Notably, Germany, which had no LNG terminal until the end of 2022, has outlined plans to install several facilities. However, due to constraints on the expansion of the LNG supply in the short term, Europe’s rise as a LNG importer also crowded out imports in other regions such as Latin America (-11 billion cubic metres in 2022 with reference to 2021) and Asia (-24 billion cubic metres). 1 The countries most affected have been emerging and developing economies that could not compete with Europe for LNG cargoes due to skyrocketing gas prices.

For both geographical reasons (LNG transportation is costly) and contractual (the US mainly relies on spot trades, in contrast to the other two major LNG producers – Australia and Qatar), the US emerged as the primary supplier of Europe in this novel configuration of the global gas market (Figure 2). While total US LNG exports expanded by 10% due to supply constraints (see above), flows towards Europe more than doubled (+140%) in 2022 on a yearly basis. Conversely, US exports to Asia halved and those to Latin America fell by about 70%. The drop in these LNG flows was only partially compensated by the mildly increased imports to Asia and Latin America from Qatar and Australia.

Figure 2 LNG exports by world region, 2021–2022 variation

The global LNG supply market is poised to increase significantly in 2025, benefiting from several LNG facilities coming online in the US. Consequently, the LNG market balances are expected to soften with benefits for the European economies in terms of energy security and procurement costs.

European policy response to the crisis

Since the start of the Ukraine conflict, a strong policy response was put in place to counter the effects of the energy crisis. Adopted policy measures can be divided into two main categories: (i) structural measures that address natural gas consumption, supply, and storage, and (ii) fiscal relief measures primarily intended to support firms and households affected by surging gas and energy prices.

In terms of structural measures, in March 2022, the EU heads of state issued the Versailles Declaration, outlining the pillars of the EU’s response to the energy crisis. These pillars were later incorporated in the EU Commission’s REPowerEU plan (May 2022), the central policy framework for the EU’s energy strategy. The plan aims to rapidly reduce the dependence on Russian fossil fuels and guarantee the long-term sustainability and stability of the EU energy system. The plan’s principles were implemented through regulatory interventions that set storage capacity targets, introduced gas consumption reductions, and established a joint gas-purchasing facility and a correction mechanism to curb gas prices. Moreover, EU countries enhanced their LNG capacities and expanded import terminals, trying to diversify natural gas suppliers and forming partnerships with non-Russian counterparts to boost LNG and piped gas imports.

To mitigate the effects of energy prices on both households and firms, EU governments also adopted several fiscal support measures in the form of energy tax abatements, energy price ceilings, and fiscal transfers to vulnerable parts of the population. These measures inevitably burdened governments’ finances: European countries allocated over €650 billion between September 2021 and January 2023 to address the impact of the energy crisis. The lion’s share of this sum was put in by Germany, which adopted fiscal measures for around €158 billion, while Italy and France allocated approximately €90 billion each (Figure 3).

Figure 3 Government response to the energy crisis among selected European countries, September 2021 to January 2023

At the euro-area level, fiscal interventions for 2022 amounted to roughly 2% of the bloc’s GDP (Checherita-Westphal and Dorrucci 2023). Yet, the application of several national measures in an untargeted manner raised concerns about the absence of a coordinated EU energy policy, which could potentially exacerbate competitive challenges in the EU and undermine the EU single market (Ferriani and Gazzani 2023, Bialek et al. 2023).

Conclusions and outlook

The Russian invasion of Ukraine exposed the world to an unparalleled energy crisis that brought energy security at the centre of both the policy and academic debate. Though the crisis reverberated globally and spilled over to other energy commodities, Europe stood at the epicentre of the shock, experiencing massive spikes in natural gas and electricity prices. The conflict in Ukraine has prompted a reshuffling of the flows in the global energy market: Europe, historically a locally integrated area with heavy dependence on imports from a primary supplier, is transforming by broadening its sources and in particular enhancing its integration with the LNG market, which is thus emerging as a key factor to close market imbalances across geographical areas.

Going forward, the outlook for the natural gas market remains subject to high uncertainty, with price volatility potentially resurging from factors such as weather-related conditions, further halts to Russian gas deliveries to Europe, increasing pressure in the global LNG market – especially if China’s demand were to fully recover, and new threats and disruptions to European energy infrastructures (e.g. the Balticconnector incident).

The 2022–2023 energy crisis has emphasised the potential of the clean-energy transition in guaranteeing affordable energy supplies and aligning economic trajectories with decarbonisation. If uncoordinated policies persist, energy costs may impact Europe’s international competitiveness and, in turn, its internal market cohesion. As Europe moves towards a clean-energy paradigm, investments in renewable energy should be accompanied by a long-term strategy to address potential vulnerabilities arising from critical minerals necessary for the transition (Leruth et al. 2022, Kowalski and Legendre 2023). This approach is crucial to prevent a repeat of the vulnerabilities experienced during the natural gas crisis while transitioning to electrification.

Disclaimer: this column does not necessarily reflect the view of the Bank of Italy or the European System of Central Banks.

Comparing China’s Engagement in Africa and Latin America

There are substantial commonalities in Beijing’s engagement between the two regions, but also differences that provide insights into how China-based entities make, and adapt, policies.

"The Diplomat" by R. Evan Ellis, October 21, 2023.

On October 12-13, 2023, the Jack D. Gordon Institute of Florida International University (FIU) hosted an event bringing together Africa and Latin America scholars, to comparatively examine engagement with China across both regions. The discussions highlighted substantial commonalities in Beijing’s engagement between the two regions, as well as differences that provide insights into how China-based entities make, and adapt, policies.

China’s public engagement in the two regions is shaped by its globally-oriented policy documents, including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and more recently, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). China works hard interacting with its partners to secure statements from them regarding their support for, or participation in, these initiatives as well as reiterating that they recognize Beijing over Taipei. 

For both Africa and Latin America, China has issued policy papers to proclaim its priorities and areas of focus in advancing its relationships. These include the 2008 China-Latin America white paper, updated in 2016, and China-Africa white papers in 2006, 2015, and 2021. In both regions, China’s public actions have been fairly consistent with the general intentions set out in these documents.

In its multilateral diplomacy, Beijing’s forum of choice has been the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Africa and the China-CELAC Forum in Latin America and the Caribbean. Both are weakly-institutionalized umbrella organizations where China’s geopolitical rivals, the United States and European Union, are absent, and where Beijing can advance its own agenda, with limited possibilities for the regions to forge collective positions to effectively bargain with China. 

With both FOCAC and the China-CELAC forum, Beijing created a structure that meets every three years at the head of state level, each time producing a roadmap for the region’s cooperation with China for the next three years. Both have established eight sub-forums, including on “people-to-people” interactions, and on “young leaders.” For Latin America, the remaining sub-forums focus on agriculture, science, and business, whereas in Africa, they focus on health, development, and media engagement, among others. Both groupings also have ad hoc forums that bring together personnel at the ministerial level, and other levels like ambassadorial and director general level, on specific topics, such as security.

In the commercial domain, China has substantially expanded its engagement with both regions in the past two decades, running a substantial trade surplus with each. With both Africa as well as Latin America, and the Caribbean, China principally purchases low value-added commodities and foodstuffs from regional countries, while selling them a broad array of higher value added, higher technology-content goods and services. With both regions, China exploits hopes for benefit through access to its markets, or partnerships for projects in local markets, to motivate cooperation, and often self-censorship regarding the actions of China government and its companies. 

In Latin America, hopes for market access have led governments to seek free trade agreements (FTAs) with China more extensively than in Africa. Latin American states that have achieved or actively negotiated FTAs with China include Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Panama. In Africa, China’s only FTA is with Mauritius, although countries like Kenya and Egypt have shown interest in pursuing their own trade deals with China.

In Africa as in Latin America and the Caribbean, China has used loans, in part, to advance its commercial engagements, with $170 billion in Chinese policy bank loans to Africa, and $136 billion to Latin America in the past two decades. In both regions, that lending fell off substantially after 2016. In both Africa and Latin America, China has avoided cooperating with multinational lender groups such as the “Paris Club” to collectively negotiate debt relief for countries that cannot pay. With both Suriname in Latin America and Zambia in Africa, China’s position as a “holdout” substantially complicated negotiations with multilateral institutions to renegotiate debt.

In both Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean, China is pursuing access to lithium, including investment in local processing facilities. China’s lithium footprint is larger in Latin America, with multiple companies and projects in Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, and Mexico. In Africa, however, a Jianxi-based company has a project to mine and transform lithium in the south of Zimbabwe. In both regions, in the construction sector, China-based companies are diversifying from state-to-state projects financed by public debt, to also participating in public bids in more strongly institutionalized states, and the use of public-private partnerships (PPP) in which they invest some of their own capital, and take on a longer-term role in the project.

In both Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa, China-based companies have expanded their presence in electricity transmission and generation, particularly in renewable energy. Chinese companies have a leading position in the electric car and bus market in Africa as well as Latin America. In both Africa and Latin America, China-based companies have dominated sensitive digital sectors, including 5G, but also in other telecommunications infrastructure, having built 70 percent of Africa’s 4G infrastructure. 

Chinese companies such as Huawei, ZTE, Xiaomi, and Oppo also play a leading role in the digital device market in both regions. In both Latin America and Africa, Chinese companies are offering smart and safe city architectures, while Chinese surveillance systems companies including Hikvision and Dahua have a dominant presence in the commercial market.

In both regions, China has established Confucius Institutes, with 44 in Latin America (10 of those in the Caribbean), and 56 in Africa. China builds connections with youth through scholarships for study in China, and a range of other “people-to-people” programs bringing thousands of journalists, academics, and government personnel to China for often lavish interactions. In both regions, China works at the local as well as national level, including sister city relationships, and courting mayors and other subnational-level officials who often have more latitude than national-level figures to accept Beijing’s generosity for themselves, their families, and their communities.

In the space domain, China has launched five satellites for African countries and 12 for Latin America. It has also help construct ground control facilities in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ethiopia, among others, and played a key role in training partner nation space personnel in those countries. In both regions, China has established space radar facilities, including in Neuquén in Argentina, and Swakopmund in Namibia.

In security cooperation, China has gone further in Africa than in Latin America, including a military base in Djibouti, regular participation in peacekeeping missions in Africa, and the conduct of some security operations on the ground and in maritime areas there. In Latin America, China participated in one peacekeeping operation in Haiti, MINUSTAH, from 2004-2012, has deployed its hospital ship, Peace Ark, to the region on three occasions, and periodically sends warships and military delegations to visit. 

China has sold military hardware to both regions, including fighter aircraft, radars, and various vehicles. In both Latin America and Africa, China has used donations to both military and police forces to strengthen relationships and create opportunities for subsequent arms sales. 

China has also regularly brought security personnel from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa to China for training. In Africa, China occasionally pays the operating expenses and salaries of security forces. In Latin America, the closest comparison has been payments by Chinese mining companies to Peruvian police to provide private security to their operations. Chinese private security companies are more active in Africa but are beginning to establish a presence in Latin America as well.

Overall, the inaugural FIU Africa Americas event demonstrated that the patterns in Chinese engagement across regions, and associated differences, are worth studying, to better understand Beijing’s decision-making, to anticipate the evolution of China’s global engagement, and to help each region learn from the other regarding best practices, and how to manage risks and increase the likelihood of hoped for benefits when engaging with China.

The Failures of America’s Foreign Policy

For the first time in decades, America’s influence on the global stage is declining after poor foreign policy decisions, and we’re running out of time to stop it.

The Science Survey, Oliver Whelan, Staff Reporter | January 18, 2023

As Americans, we’re constantly reminded of our country’s recent failures. In the news, bold print headlines describe the latest setbacks. Investment portfolios depreciate and the stock market falters due to an impending recession. Even at home, energy and fuel bills skyrocket, caused by oil sanctions and supply cuts. Our international allies suffer as well; Ukraine is fending off a Russian invasion, which some believe to be the current President Joseph R. Biden’s fault, Taiwan faces the threat of a war with China, and European countries have begun to lose faith in America’s ability to protect them, which has led them to compensate with a dangerous level of militarization. As the impacts of a weakened America are undeniably felt throughout the world, it is time to address the hard truth: America’s foreign policy is failing, and we’re running out of time to do something about it.

Twenty years ago, if you said America wouldn’t be the preeminent superpower for decades to come, nobody would believe you. Now, it seems as if America is merely a trailing competitor against China and Russia in a race for global dominance. A strengthening Russo-China alliance has alarmed Europe since their combined economic and militaristic power could rival NATO, and by extension, the U.S. To compound it, China and Russia have worked to establish relationships with anti-American states, such as Afghanistan, which has spread their spheres of influence into regions that could possibly pose a threat to U.S. international security.

Americans know this shift of power didn’t happen overnight, or even as the result of a single presidency. Since the start of the millennium, we have witnessed backward policies, international concessions, and an emphasis on external reliance chip away at America’s integrity. But only now are we starting to feel its impacts. 

I spoke with Michael Rubin, a senior fellow at a public policy think tank called the American Enterprise Institute, who agreed: U.S. foreign policy is not nearly as effective as it once was. “The United States has not implemented a coherent strategy for more than a quarter century,” he said. “Either the State Department has been entirely reactive rather than proactive, or there has been a strategy such as George W. Bush’s democracy agenda that went entirely unimplemented.” It’s true. Many agree that the U.S.’s involvement with the Dayton Accords in the 1990’s, which brought an end to a four year war in Bosnia, was the last great triumph of American foreign policy.

“During the Cold War, America was very, very involved in other countries in Europe and Asia. [America was] deeply involved in those countries and propping up their governments, putting a lot of money and investments into [them, especially] putting military resources to those countries for the sake of countering Russia,” explained a research associate for The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) who wished to remain unnamed. “When 9/11 happened, I think it was a big shock because America realized that we were not invincible and we were vulnerable, even in our homeland.”

Most Americans view the year 2000 as the pinnacle of American strength, and they also agree that everything went downhill after it. A survey conducted by the Morning Consult said Americans felt “a greater sense of security” in that year, which makes sense given that America had just emerged as the sole superpower of the world after the end of the Cold War nearly ten years before. The year after, the attacks of 9/11 wrenched America out of its brief period of uncontested strength, and into a new era of war and a heightened sense of American-centrism. Just as the attack on Pearl Harbor in the ’40s and the “Nuke Terror” of the ‘50s had launched America into a new phase, September 11th changed America, and it hasn’t been the same since.

“[The attacks] made us a little more defensive and a little bit less focused on going around the world involved with others,” CFR elaborated. “We are still very focused on international relations, but it made us more vulnerable and made the U.S. more concerned about possible threats.” 

A non-governmental entity from across the globe had managed to do more damage to the mainland U.S than two world wars and a nuclear standoff with Russia had. Naturally, people gravitated to more defensive and self-centered policies after 2001. From this re-emerged the “America First” ideology. The term was coined by Woodrow Wilson in his 1916 presidential campaign. Despite its emergence being roughly a century before, “America First” appealed to post-9/11 policy makers because, as Wilson intended, the policy emphasized non-interventionism, and many believed U.S. interference in the Middle East, like America’s association with Israel, a state frequently characterized as “anti Islamic”, caused the attacks. 

We still feel the impacts of nationalism and non-interventionism in our foreign policy today. Only a couple years ago, former President Donald J. Trump instated a foreign policy that focused heavily on “America First.” Throughout his term, he prioritized benefiting America, which meant reneging many alliances and partnerships, often leading to weakened international relations. 

I interviewed Anthony Arend, Professor of Government and Foreign Service and Chair of the Department of Government at Georgetown University, who elaborated on the impacts of a self-centered America. “This idea [of “America First”] – which is not new to U.S. history – produced disastrous effects. It empowered Putin to engage in the invasion of Ukraine and likely emboldened authoritarians in a variety of countries. Moreover, it raised doubts among our allies that we were reliable alliance partners.”

It has been a recent presidential trend to drastically change foreign policy every time a new president takes office. Mr. Trump’s presidential term is known for rolling back many of former President Barack Obama’s deals, like the Paris Climate Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which he said forced the U.S. to make concessions. Now, President Biden has tried to reverse some of Mr. Trump’s changes by re-entering the Paris Agreement and reopening diplomatic ties that were severed. Despite this, significant damage has already been done as this “hot and cold” dynamic within U.S. foreign policy has caused international weariness. More than anything, these past two presidencies signify a larger theme of how America’s weakened and internal structure has in turn negatively impacted our international relations.

While it’s uncertain when political polarization started in the U.S., we know that former President Trump’s run for office in 2016 ignited an unprecedented amount of political division. This estrangement spanned beyond voters. The Supreme Court now has a 6-3 republican majority after former President Trump nominated Amy Coney Barrett, Brett Kavanaugh, and Neil M. Gorsuch. We also see other governmental bodies, like congress, find it increasingly more difficult to agree on and pass legislation due to polarization, which has stalled overall advancement. 

“Because the country is so divided and because the Republican and Democratic Parties are so polarized…, it’s getting harder to pass international relations bills or agreements that need support from both political parties,” continued CFR. Interestingly, when it comes to foreign policy, the right tends toward nationalism (and increasingly “America first”) while the left tends toward interventionism, despite both parties ultimately working towards the same goal. “I think the concept [of “America First”] betrays itself,” CFR added. “What I mean by that is that the idea of “America First” is, instead of putting so much money and military resources all around the world…let’s focus on our own citizens. I think the problem is, because we are the greatest power in the world. If the U.S. truly enacted an “America First” policy, that would allow countries like Russia and China to take a more aggressive approach on the global stage because we wouldn’t be there to stop them.” 

While both sides of the political spectrum believe that their foreign policies are more effective than the other’s, in fact, neither is singularly better. This is because the U.S. government, especially when dealing with international relations, relies heavily on internal collaboration, not only on  parties, but on  strategies, ideas, and other aspects. We have seen how a divided government crumbles when faced with true, global adversity — COVID-19. Our COVID-19 pandemic response was a catastrophic failure simply because the government couldn’t agree how to address the threat. 

Mr. Rubin emphasized the importance of cooperation as well, stating, “Diplomacy never works alone. Strategists talk about the DIME model: every strategy should have diplomatic, informational, military, and economic components. Often, Americans sequence the strategies but in reality the whole is always greater than the sum of the parts. Consider Iran, for example. Trying diplomacy is all well and good, but does sanctions relief prior to agreements reduce leverage in a way that makes a good agreement more difficult?”

Though the most imminent threat to U.S. foreign policy is internal division, the impending threat, and one that the U.S. will have to struggle to overcome, is China. In recent years, China has become the world’s largest economy, overtaking the U.S. by about 20 percent. With its population already more than four times that of the U.S.’s, and only technological sophistication and militaristic assets being the differentiating factor between it and the U.S., many say it is only a matter of time before China overtakes the U.S. as the world’s new superpower. Certainly, on our current trajectory, the U.S. is falling behind. 

It’s hard to predict what a world where China is the sole superpower will look like, but it’s clear that if it happens, the U.S. will lose much of its global influence that lingered from its “golden days” of diplomacy. We are already starting to see China expand its presence beyond Asia and into distant countries, particularly in African countries. We can expect to see more instances like the negotiation of the Iran Nuclear Deal, where the U.S. was forced to make concessions to reach agreement, and even still, the deal only made both sides uneasy. Recently, the U.S. and Iran have discussed reopening negotiations, but this time, with China’s increased involvement. 

What this signifies, if anything, is that now more than ever, America must return to its roots of collaborating with foreign nations. Regardless of which country is more powerful, America’s international involvement has, and will continue to be, a crucial aspect in maintaining global peace. Our foreign policy for the next few decades must emphasize collaboration, both foreign and domestic. 

The U.S. must work with itself. Now, America lacks a united front when it comes to foreign policy, which has only come back to hurt us. “Not everything should be the subject for slash-and-burn political warfare,” agreed Mr. Rubin. “Politicians should work behind-the-scenes across the aisle for the good of the United States. It’s crucial to form a consensus on strategy outside the media spotlight… [Additionally,] the Senate should take its oversight role more seriously, as it did in the Carter and Reagan-eras when top leaders worked across the aisle and refused to allow the State Department autonomy to pursue its worst instincts without consequence.”

In this time of change and uncertainty, the U.S. has looked to the past for answers, re-purposing ideas like “America First” and nationalism. This solution has brought nothing but deteriorating international relations and a declining presence on the global stage. If America wants to remain relevant for the coming decades, we must adapt, not only to the idea that we may no longer be the preeminent superpower, but to change internally as well. Only then will our foreign policy succeed in protecting America’s integrity, just as it has for centuries.

“Not everything should be the subject for slash-and-burn political warfare … Politicians should work behind-the-scenes across the aisle for the good of the United States. It’s crucial to form a consensus on strategy outside the media spotlight… [Additionally,] The Senate should take its oversight role more seriously, as it did in the Carter and Reagan-eras when top leaders worked across the aisle and refused to allow the State Department autonomy to pursue its worst instincts without consequence,” said Michael Rubin, a senior fellow at a public policy think tank called the American Enterprise Institute.

Zelensky accuses China of helping Russia sabotage peace summit

Ukrainian president unleashes on Beijing, saying it’s helping Moscow threaten countries with higher food and fuel prices to convince them not to attend June 15-16 meeting.

POLITICO EU BY ZOYA SHEFTALOVICH, SUZANNE LYNCH AND STUART LAU, JUNE 2, 2024 

SINGAPORE — Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy hit out at China, accusing the country of helping Russia derail a peace summit this month in Switzerland.

"Russia, using Chinese influence on the region, using Chinese diplomats also, does everything to disrupt the peace summit," Zelenskyy said Sunday during a press conference after delivering an address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.

In a rare public rebuke of China — after years of careful attempts to court Beijing and peel it away from its "no limits" friendship with Russia — Zelenskyy's frustration appeared to boil over in Singapore. He said Ukraine had evidence that China was assisting Moscow's war efforts, despite the fact that Chinese President Xi Jinping had promised him in a phone call a year ago that Beijing would not get involved.

"We do not expect military support from China. We have never asked them ... But we do not expect China to provide defense support to Russia," Zelenskyy said. "That is what we discussed with the Chinese leader by phone. He promised me China would stand aside, would not support Russia with weapons. Today, there is intelligence that somehow, some way, some things come to Russia’s markets via China … elements of Russia’s weaponry come from China."

Earlier Sunday, China’s Defense Minister Dong Jun insisted that Beijing wasn't fueling Russian President Vladimir Putin's war effort.

China "has not provided weapons to either side, and has strict control over exports of dual-use goods," Dong said during his own speech at the Shangri-La summit. “We stand firmly on the side of peace and dialogue.”

It comes after the second most senior figure in the U.S. State Department, Kurt Campbell, told media outlets including POLITICO last week: "It is fair to say that China's general goal has been not only to support Russia — in our view, to the hilt — but to downplay that publicly and try to maintain normal diplomatic and commercial ties with Europe."

Zelenskyy also accused China of refusing to meet with Ukraine.

“Many times we have wanted to meet Chinese representatives," including Xi, he said. "Unfortunately Ukraine does not have any powerful connections with China because China does not want it.”

He confirmed he had not met with any Chinese officials while in Singapore.

Peace summit call

Earlier, on the Shangri-La main stage, Zelenskyy called on Asia-Pacific countries to show their commitment to peace by attending the June 15-16 summit in Switzerland.

“I urge your leaders to join,” an impassioned Zelenskyy said. “By uniting against one war, we create for the world the real experience of overcoming any war, and of diplomacy that does work."

Zelenskyy said 106 countries had so far confirmed they would send representatives to the Swiss summit, but added that the Kremlin and some of its allies — one of which he later identified as China — have been pressuring others not to attend.

“Russia is trying to disrupt the peace summit,” Zelenskyy said. “What Russia is doing ... it is now traveling around many countries in the world and threatening them with the blockade of agricultural goods, of food products, it is threatening to increase prices for energy, and it is pushing countries around the world so they are not present at the summit.”

He added: “And now there is information that certain states are assisting it."

China has opted not to send a delegation to the Swiss summit, saying it would not attend because Russia wasn't invited. Instead, Beijing has floated the idea of hosting its own peace conference with both Russia and Ukraine to be represented. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov indicated last week that Moscow would be amenable to that idea. 

Asked during the press conference Sunday whether Ukraine would attend China's proposed summit, Zelenskyy said it was not Beijing's place to call such a meeting.

"Ukraine is the victim of the war. It is us who have to initiate everything ... Nobody else is fully aware of what Russia has brought with this war to our state," he said. "It is Ukrainians who have died, Russians were raping our women, they have stolen tens of thousands of our children. No one else has the right to dictate how this war should end."

Criss-crossing the world

Earlier, during his public remarks, Zelenskyy said it was important for as many of the world's leaders as possible to travel to Switzerland so that "the global majority" can agree "on the common understandings and steps" to help end the war in Ukraine, now in its third year after Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022.

"The relevant parties will pass this to Russia, aiming for an outcome similar to the grain initiative," Zelenskyy added, referring to the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which was brokered by the U.N. and Turkey to allow Ukrainian grain exports to flow.

Zelenskyy, who has been criss-crossing the world in an effort to convince leaders to travel to Switzerland later this month, said he wanted to discuss three topics there: nuclear security, food security and the release of prisoners of war as well as the Ukrainian children who have been abducted by Russia. 

Zelenskyy said he was “disappointed some world leaders have not yet confirmed their participation” at the Swiss summit. U.S. President Joe Biden, who is facing an election in November, has not confirmed his attendance, though he will be present at the G7 summit in Italy which takes place just before the Swiss gathering.

Zelenskyy held a series of meetings in Singapore, including with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, members of the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, Timor-Leste’s President José Ramos-Horta and Indonesia’s President-elect Prabowo Subianto. Zelenskyy said in a statement in the early hours of Sunday that he had invited both Ramos-Horta and Prabowo to Switzerland, with the former accepting the invitation.

“Time is running out, and the children are growing up in their Putin-land, where they are taught to hate their homeland, and are lied to, being told they have no families while their loved ones wait for them at home in Ukraine,” the Ukrainian president said on stage in Singapore, addressing the audience in English.

“I’m here to state that we’ve found a way to restore diplomacy,” said Zelenskyy in his speech. “We can make it real. Not so long ago, it seemed that the world would always be fragmented, but we showed that nations are capable of cooperation.”

Noting that nearly 100 Russian missiles and drones had hit Ukraine overnight, Zelenskyy said: “No country could handle these alone. Everyone in the world who helps us with air defense systems … thank you so much." He name-checked the United States, the Netherlands and Germany. 

“Putin believes he is allowed to do anything. By the mid-2010s, Russia brought a war to our lands, a war that Ukraine never, never wanted, did not provoke,” Zelenskyy said.

Sitting in the front row for Zelenskyy's speech were Austin and EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell, as well as multiple European defense ministers. The Singaporean and Malaysian defense chiefs were on stage as Zelenskyy spoke.

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